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From Bad to Worse
ASSESSING THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
FOUR CONTROVERSIAL FCC DECISIONS
Rob Frieden†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Far too many major decisions of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) rely on flawed
assumptions about the current and future telecommunications
marketplaces. When the FCC incorrectly overstates the current
level of competition,1 it risks exacerbating its mistake going
forward if actual competition proves unsustainable or
lackluster. In many key decisions, the FCC cited robust
competition in current and future markets as the basis for
deregulatory decisions that relax restrictions on incumbents,
abandon strategies for promoting competition, or apply
statutory definitions of services that trigger limited
government oversight.2 If the FCC has confidence in the
†
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Pennsylvania State University; email: rmf5@psu.edu.
1
“[T]here is substantial competition in the provision of Internet access
services.” In re AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp., Application for Transfer of Control, 22
FCC Rcd. 5662, 5724-25 (Mar. 26, 2007) (memorandum opinion and order). In 2008 the
FCC stated that “advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.” In re Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 9615,
9616 (June 12, 2008) (fifth report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-08-88A1.pdf. On the other hand, at about the same time the FCC
stated that “[s]tudy after study demonstrates that our nation’s broadband
infrastructure lags dramatically behind other industrialized nations. In order to
reverse this trend, we must encourage ‘third pipe’ technologies to provide some at least
some [sic] challenge to the cable/telco broadband duopoly in our cities.” In re
Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of
the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, 21 FCC Rcd. 6703, 6727
(June 2, 2006) (order on reconsideration of the second report and order).
2
An FCC conclusion that robust competition exists provides the basis for a
reviewing court to affirm the Commission’s decision that it can deregulate. For
example, the FCC abandoned rules requiring incumbent carriers to make available
local switching and routing services to market entrants based on the determination
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viability and permanence of competition, then reviewing courts
will likely refrain from second-guessing the Commission and
uphold its deregulatory initiative. In its zeal to announce
deregulatory decisions and to accrue political dividends, the
Commission ignores secondary and tertiary consequences of
decisions that deprive it of the jurisdiction and flexibility
needed to respond to technological and marketplace changes.3
Ironically, the FCC has not promoted competition. It
has exacerbated the trend toward concentration of ownership
generated by technological convergence and the real (or
perceived) need for incumbents to grow larger by acquiring
competitors. Instead of making sure that this trend does not
lead to oligopolistic behavior, which can harm consumers,4 the
that newcomers could survive in the marketplace by acquiring facilities from other
competitors, or by paying full wholesale rates: “[T]he presence of robust competition in
a market where CLECs use critical ILEC facilities by purchasing special access at
wholesale rates . . . precludes a finding that the CLECs are ‘impaired’ by lack of access
to the element under § 251(c)(3).” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 593 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (the FCC should not implement statutory requirements that incumbent
carriers cooperate with market entrants when the Commission determines that
adequate marketplace competition exist).
3
For example, the FCC has expressed confidence that it can assert its
ancillary jurisdiction to achieve consumer protection even if it previously opted to
streamline or eliminate regulatory safeguards.
We have a duty to ensure that consumer protection objectives in the Act are met
as the industry shifts from narrowband to broadband services. Through this
Notice, we thus seek to develop a framework for consumer protection in the
broadband age—a framework that ensures that consumer protection needs are
met by all providers of broadband Internet access service, regardless of the
underlying technology. This framework necessarily will be built on our ancillary
jurisdiction under Title I; as we explain in the Order, this jurisdiction is ample to
accomplish the consumer protection goals we identify below, and we will not
hesitate to exercise it.
In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,929-30 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband Classification Order] (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking).
“We emphasize that we will not hesitate to adopt any non-economic regulatory
obligations that are necessary to ensure consumer protection and network security and
reliability in this dynamically changing broadband era.” Id. at 14,915.
4
A duopoly controls the broadband Internet access marketplace in the
United States.
Cable and DSL providers currently control almost 98 percent of the residential
and small-business broadband market. More than one quarter of consumers have
only one choice between cable and DSL, and even in markets with both services
available, customers usually face a duopoly, with one choice for each type of
service. Under any economic standard “nearly every regional broadband market
is very highly concentrated.” The problem this situation generates is really very
simple to grasp: in order to “reach” the logical and content layers, one has to “pass
through” the physical layer; whoever controls the physical layer, unless restricted
by law, becomes a gatekeeper for all other layers; and scarcity of physical layers
means more control, and ability to realize that control, for fewer gatekeepers.
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FCC has removed still-necessary regulatory safeguards
designed to curb market power without robbing ventures of
opportunities to operate efficiently. Intentionally or not, the
FCC has contributed to market concentration5 even as it
abandoned lawful techniques and policies to monitor and
remedy likely marketplace abuses.6
The FCC has embraced economic and political theory
supporting reliance on marketplace forces without a complete
empirical confirmation that industry self-regulation can occur.
The Commission infers the existence of adequate competition
and concludes that such competition will persist even though
economic, technological, and future regulatory decisions might
favor industry concentration and unsustainable competition.
Information, communications, and entertainment markets

Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from
Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2008) (citations omitted). “So long
as wireline Internet access remains a closed duopoly controlled by the incumbent LEC
and the incumbent cable company, the FCC will need to step in as the ‘traffic cop’ for
ensuring nondiscriminatory Internet access.” Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding,
Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for
Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 120 (Dec. 2010).
5
“Even with one less nationwide mobile telephone carrier to choose from,
U.S. consumers continue to benefit from robust competition in the CMRS marketplace.”
In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947, 11,029 (Sept. 29, 2006) (eleventh
report) (dismissing any adverse impact from Sprint’s merger with Nextel).
6
It took the FCC over four years to detect and remedy over $52 million of
deliberate data-service overcharges imposed by Verizon Wireless. See In re Verizon
Wireless Data Usage Charges, 25 FCC Rcd. 15,105 (Oct. 28, 2010) (order). Because the
charges refer to Internet access, Verizon arguably could have claimed the FCC lacked
jurisdiction to intervene, based on the assertion that all forms of Internet access
constitute information services. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002)
(declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). The FCC rejected the assertion
by Verizon and other wireless carriers that it lacked jurisdiction to compel the carrier
to provide data service to subscribers of other carriers.
Because encouraging data roaming serves the public interest by promoting
connectivity for, and ubiquitous access to, mobile broadband as well as facilitating
consumer access to wireless broadband data coverage nationwide, the obligations
set forth above are reasonably ancillary to the Title III provisions to manage
spectrum, allocate, assign, and to establish spectrum usage conditions in the
public interest as set forth above.
In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, 5442 n.176
(Apr. 7, 2011) (second report and order); Maisie Ramsay, Verizon Sues FCC over Data
Roaming Rules, WIRELESS WEEK (May 18, 2011), http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/
2011/05/Policy-and-Industry-Verizon-Sues-FCC-Data-Roaming-Rules-Legal/.
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favor large enterprises able to exploit economies of scale7 and
scope.8 Technological and marketplace convergence supports
the ability of large firms to offer bundles of services previously
offered on a single, standalone basis. Additionally, the FCC’s
willingness to conditionally approve mergers and acquisitions
also leads to industry consolidation.
The FCC’s deregulatory decisions operate in one
direction—the elimination of regulatory safeguards—typically
without reserving any lawful and effective option to reassert
safeguards should assumptions prove wrong or circumstances
change. For example, the FCC’s decision to classify all Internet
access technologies9 as information services10—consequently

7

Economies of scale refers to the ability of a single firm to offer goods and
services at the lowest cost by increasing its size. “[A]n increase in inputs leads to a
proportionally greater increase in outputs (for example, a doubling of inputs would lead to
more than a doubling of outputs).” Kevin G. Wilson, Deregulating Telecommunications and
the Problem of Natural Monopoly: A Critique of Economics in Telecommunications Policy, 14
MEDIA CULTURE & SOC. 343, 345 (1992). “Declining levels of average cost accompanying
greater expansion of product output and optimal use of plant and equipment. Cost
advantages associated with the increasing size of firms.” MEDIA ECONOMICS THEORY AND
PRACTICE, Glossary 286 (Alison Alexander et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
Scale economies refer to lower average costs from producing a larger quantity of
output. A more technical definition is that economies of scale exist at a particular
range of output when the long run average total cost decreases as output expands.
Scale economies can be a barrier to entry if entrants are likely to acquire fewer
customers and sell less output than the incumbent, and the resulting higher
average cost for the entrants makes it difficult for them to compete with the
incumbent, particularly if retail prices are close to the incumbent’s average cost.
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 17,028, n.245 (2003) (report and order and order on
remand and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted).
8

Economies of scope exist when one firm can produce two or more products at a
lower total cost than if each product were produced separately by different firms.
Scope economies can be a barrier to entry if entrants are unable to produce and
sell all of the products the incumbent produces, and the resulting higher cost
makes it unprofitable to enter the market.
Id. at 17,029, n.246.
9
The FCC has determined that various broadband technologies for
accessing the Internet all qualify for limited regulatory oversight. See, e.g., In re
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and their Facilities,
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967 (2005); Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,855.
10
An information service is defined as
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
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reducing oversight of Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs)
network management—now prevents the Commission from
responding to complaints that some ISPs have interfered with
subscribers’ Internet traffic. Should an ISP, such as Comcast,
deliberately disrupt subscribers’ traffic,11 which can offer a
competitive alternative to the company’s pay-per-view videoprogramming services,12 the FCC has no direct statutory
authority to sanction the company for engaging in
anticompetitive conduct.13 Worse yet, the decision to treat basic
bit transmission as an information service severely restricts
the Commission’s ability to impose safeguards on services that
combine Internet access with software to provide the functional
equivalent of a regulated service (e.g., Voice over the Internet
Protocol (VoIP)14 and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV)).15 The
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
11
In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd.
13,028 (Aug. 20, 2008) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Comcast
Sanction], order vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
12
Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have
become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet users
have the opportunity to view high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might
otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand (VOD) service. Comcast
Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,030.
13
See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 568 (2010);
Edward B. Mulligan V, Note, Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management
Regulation Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 635 (2010); Courtney Erin Smith,
Comment, Net Neutrality, Full Throttle: Regulation of Broadband Internet Service
Following the Comcast/BitTorrent Dispute, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 587 (2010).
14
VoIP is the real-time carriage and delivery of data packets that correspond
to voice. VoIP services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both
computers and ordinary telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP
works, see Susan Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges
Associated with the Evolution to VoIP, FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.fcc.gov/events/
tutorial-technical-challenges-associated-evolution-voip. See generally Charles J. Cooper
& Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for Preemptive
Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2008).
15
IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download
video files or view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. In re
Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Emergency Petition for Temporary Standstill, DA 10-679, 25
FCC Rcd. 3879 (2010). Some of the available content duplicates what cable television
subscribers receive therein triggering disputes over whether cable operators can secure
exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider from
distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been providing its subscribers with
certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years, including the
Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the
Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of its
service offering.” Id. at 3879-80. For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The
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FCC’s decision to apply the information-service classification to
all Internet-access technologies means that the Commission
has abandoned direct statutory authority to resolve problems
and, in the future, must resort to questionable ancillary
jurisdiction16 to resolve legitimate complaints and impose
necessary regulatory safeguards.
There are other instances of unintended consequences
resulting from decisions based on the FCC’s overly optimistic
findings and assumptions about marketplace competition:
removing caps on the total spectrum a single wireless carrier
can control;17 abandoning local loop unbundling18 and other
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009).
In addition, [Local Exchange Carriers] are increasingly utilizing Internet Protocol
Television (“IPTV”) technologies. Verizon’s FTTH [fiber to the home] network,
marketed under the brand name “FiOS,” allows delivery of multichannel video
services, in addition to telephony and high-speed Internet access service. At the end
of 2006, Verizon reported that it offered video programming via FiOS to more than
2.4 million households in 200 cities in 10 states and served 207,000 subscribers.
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 548 (Jan. 16, 2009) (thirteenth annual report);
see also In-Sung Yoo, supra, at 204.
16
Ancillary jurisdiction refers to an inference of statutory authority to impose
rules and regulations based on indirect statutory authority. For example, the FCC asserted
jurisdiction over cable television operators because the importation of distant broadcast
television signals could have had an adverse financial impact on directly regulated
television broadcasters. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); see also
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 696-709 (1979); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649, 659-70 (1972).
17
In re 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 16 FCC Rcd. 22,668 (Nov. 18, 2001) (report and order).
18
Telecommunications carriers have
[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the
provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network
elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms,
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and
section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2006); see also In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499 (Aug. 8, 1996)
(first report and order), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525
U.S. 366 (1999); In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (Nov. 5, 1999) (third report and
order and fourth further notice of proposed rulemaking), rev’d and remanded, United
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Review of the Section
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 16 FCC Rcd.
22,781 (Dec. 20, 2001); In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978 (Aug. 21, 2003) (report and
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structural separation requirements;19 and concluding that
incumbent carriers have no duty to deal with market entrants,
even when the incumbent prices the wholesale rate charged to
competitors above retail rates.20 For each of these decisions, the
FCC compounded its initial mistakes by foreclosing the option
to make necessary and lawful future modifications.
This article will examine the consequences of the FCC’s
wishful thinking about the viability of current competition and
the sustainability of competition going forward. The article
concludes that flawed fact finding and market projections had
adverse initial consequences but have even worse future
impacts. In response to aggressive incumbent advocacy,
impatient lawmakers keen on deregulation, and deferential
judges willing to rely on the Commission’s expertise,21 the FCC
has contributed to the development of a telecommunications
industry structure that is less competitive,22 innovative,
available,23 affordable, and responsive than what exists in many
order and order on remand and further notice of proposed rulemaking), corrected by
Errata, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003), vacated and remanded in part, aff’d in part, United
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
19
The FCC eliminated Title II and structural separation requirements applicable
to wireline broadband Internet-access services offered by facilities-based providers and gave
providers discretion to offer the underlying wireline broadband transmission on a commoncarrier basis. Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3.
20
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-57
(2009) (no supplemental antitrust relief available when the FCC determines that a
carrier has no duty to deal with a competitor).
21
To avoid “legislating from the bench” or second guessing the technical
expertise of the FCC, reviewing courts typically defer to the Commission:
Our task on review is therefore limited. We review the FCC’s action in this case
only to ensure that it is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). That standard is
particularly deferential in matters such as this, which implicate competing policy
choices, technical expertise, and predictive market judgments.
Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Time Warner Telecom,
Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 221 (3d Cir. 2007).
22
“Unfortunately, the U.S. is lagging behind much of the rest of the world in
terms of broadband service available to its citizens. As we move into a world in which
‘everyone will use the Internet for everything’ this country runs the risk of not being
competitive.” RICHARD ADLER, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, NEWS CITIES: THE NEXT
GENERATION OF HEALTHY INFORMED COMMUNITIES 27 (2011), available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/cands/News_Cities_The_
Next_Generation_of_Healthy_Informed_Communities.pdf.
23
For example, even though the United States has the most broadband lines
in use it only ranks 15th in terms of broadband market penetration (subscribers per
100 inhabitants) based on statistics compiled by the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development on national broadband and telecommunications market
penetration. See OECD Broadband Portal, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/54/
0,3746,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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other countries.24 The FCC’s follies provide a clear warning to
other national regulatory authorities: embracing political and
economic doctrine at the expense of unbiased fact finding and
empirical analysis generates bad decisions that trigger even
worse long-term outcomes.
Part II of this article will identify four FCC decisions that
started a major deregulatory campaign based on unqualified
conclusions about the existence and sustainability of competition.
Section A examines the Commission’s decision to treat Internet
access as an unregulated information service. Section B tracks the
Commission’s deregulatory glide path for common carriers,
including decisions to abandon precompetitive interconnection
and access-pricing requirements as well as structural safeguards
that separate carriers’ telecommunications and information
services. This section, emphasizing antitrust and traditional
duties to deal, also considers how reviewing courts respond to
FCC deregulation and the Commission’s assumptions about
market competitiveness. Section C examines the marketplace
consequences of the FCC’s decision to allow wireless carriers to
acquire unlimited spectrum regardless of the impact on market
entry by new competitors. Part III offers conclusions on the shortand long-term consequences of premature deregulation when the
marketplace has insufficient competition and market actors do
not self-regulate.
II.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE

On numerous occasions spanning several decades, the
FCC has decided to abandon or reduce regulatory oversight.
Technological innovations, changed circumstances, and a host
of legitimate reasons can support selective deregulation.
However, a significant number of initiatives, four of which are
examined in depth in this article, were wrong at the outset.
When the FCC makes a bad call, the normal checks and
balances in government are supposed to provide remedies (e.g.,
judicial review). But well-argued rationales, coupled with
shared views on economic doctrine and judicial deference to
FCC expertise,25 can prevent appellate review from reversing
24

See International Comparison Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband
Data Improvement Act, International Broadband Data Report, IB Docket No. 10-171,
Second Report, 26 FCC Rcd. 7378 (May 20, 2011) (second report).
25
Supreme Court Justice Scalia shows how the FCC can exploit judicial
deference to engage in policymaking outside its lawful jurisdiction:
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bad decisions. Once in play, these decisions can trigger
secondary and tertiary consequences that the FCC might not
have predicted—consequences that, over time, compound the
harm caused by the initial decision.
The four decisions examined in this article show how the
FCC has engaged in results-driven decision making that lacks
empirical support and uses legally unsustainable rationales to
bolster preordained results. Authors of these decisions have
emphasized stakeholder-submitted data without much close
scrutiny by Commission staff or third-party peer review.26 In the
absence of independently generated data, the FCC has had to
rely largely on stakeholder-submitted materials that support a
particular outcome. Such reliance prevents the Commission
from generating a realistic assessment based on a thorough and
critical evaluation of all submissions, coupled with in-house fact
finding and analysis. The agency has a statutory obligation to
compile a complete factual record27 and to accord interested
parties opportunities to participate.28 However, the Commission
This is a wonderful illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some
assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic
discretions. The main source of the Commission’s regulatory authority over
common carriers is Title II, but the Commission has rendered that inapplicable in
this instance by concluding that the definition of “telecommunications service” is
ambiguous and does not (in its current view) apply to cable-modem service. It
contemplates, however, altering that (unnecessary) outcome, not by changing the
law (i.e., its construction of the Title II definitions), but by reserving the right to
change the facts. Under its undefined and sparingly used “ancillary” powers, the
Commission might conclude that it can order cable companies to “unbundle” the
telecommunications component of cable-modem service. And presto, Title II will
then apply to them, because they will finally be “offering” telecommunications
service! Of course, the Commission will still have the statutory power to forbear
from regulating them under § 160 (which it has already tentatively concluded it
would do, Declaratory Ruling 4847–4848, ¶¶ 94–95). Such Möbius–strip reasoning
mocks the principle that the statute constrains the agency in any meaningful way.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1013-14
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the FCC’s rationale for considering cable
modem service as lacking a standalone telecommunications service and noting how
some reviewing courts fail to scrutinize closely the Commission’s analysis).
26
See generally Rob Frieden, Case Studies in Abandoned Empiricism and the
Lack of Peer Review at the Federal Communications Commission, 8 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 277 (2010).
27
“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding statutory requirement that
satellite master antenna television system operators secure a franchise if they link
separately owned buildings or use public rights of way constitutional even though
single building service had no such franchising requirement).
28
See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 231 (2008)
(FCC “failed to satisfy the notice and comment requirement of the Administrative
Procedure Act (‘APA’) by redacting studies on which it relied in promulgating the rule
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has primarily relied on the more comprehensive filings of the
parties who have the most to gain or lose in a proceeding. It
becomes easy for the FCC to rely on nonempirical data compiled
by stakeholders that purport to supply data, but who in reality
advocate for a desired outcome regardless of whether the facts
support this objective.
A.

Unconditional Conclusion that Broadband Access
Constitutes an Information Service

The FCC has determined that the legislatively crafted
information-service classification29 applies to Internet access
provided via cable modems,30 digital subscriber line (DSL)
service,31 the electrical power grid,32 and wireless networks.33
The Commission accrued short-term political dividends from
such determinations because the determinations showed
regulatory restraint and endorsed marketplace selfregulation.34 Whether the result of wishful thinking, inflexible
and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its choice of the extrapolation factor
for” predicting how quickly broadband over powerline (BPL) emissions attenuate or
weaken); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006).
29
Information service is defined as,
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
30
In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice
of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005).
31
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,863.
32
In re United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding
the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information
Service, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,281 (Nov. 7, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order).
33
In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the
Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (Mar. 23, 2007) (declaratory ruling).
34
FCC managers are keenly aware of the political consequences resulting
from changes in policy.
[I]n examining rulemaking and transitions in all three branches of government
from the agency’s perspective, it may be most helpful to consider how the agency
analyzes the costs and benefits of rulemaking. This cost-benefit calculation is
quite different than the one typically discussed in administrative law—whether a
particular regulation has net benefits to society. Instead, the calculation considers
the net benefits of a rulemaking, both in terms of substance and process, to an
agency in light of the particular costs to the agency. On the benefit side, the
agency may care about the regulatory outcome; budgetary, political, and status
rewards; and judicial deference. On the cost side, the agency may worry about
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adherence to libertarian economic doctrine, or fair-minded
interpretation of applicable statutes, the FCC determined that it
must apply a single, mutually exclusive service classification.35
Under this either/or doctrine, the FCC opted to abandon any
direct statutory foundation for mandating fair and open Internet
access. Soon after these decisions, the FCC confronted instances
where self-regulation did not prevent anticompetitive practices.
Comcast, for example, interfered with the broadband traffic
generated by some subscribers in ways that evidenced the
incentive and ability to distort competition in the videoprogramming retail market.36 As discussed later in this section,
Comcast, lacking effective FCC oversight, unilaterally thwarted
subscriber access to competitive alternatives to the company’s
pay-per-view video content.37
With an eye toward freeing the Internet of government
oversight, the Commission applied the substantially less
restrictive information-service classification to all types of
Internet-access services based on the view that the

regulatory outcome; budgetary, political, and status fallout; and reversal by the
courts.
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 471, 487 (2011); see also, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking:
An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008).
35
In its quest to deregulate all broadband options, the FCC opted to treat
wireless Internet access as an information service even though subscribers use a single
handset for making telephone calls and accessing the Internet:
We conclude, as the Commission did in the Universal Service Order, that the
categories of “telecommunications service” and “information service” in the 1996 Act
are mutually exclusive. Reading the statute closely, with attention to the legislative
history, we conclude that Congress intended these new terms to build upon
frameworks established prior to the passage of the 1996 Act. Specifically, we find
that Congress intended the categories of “telecommunications service” and
“information service” to be mutually exclusive, like the definitions of “basic service”
and “enhanced service” developed in our Computer II proceeding, and the definitions
of “telecommunications” and “information service” developed in the Modification of
Final Judgment that divested the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T.
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,507-08
(Apr. 10, 1998) (report to Congress) (citations omitted). “Although the Commission has
not been entirely consistent on this point, we agree for the wireline broadband Internet
access described in this Order with the past Commission pronouncements that the
categories of ‘information service’ and ‘telecommunications service’ are mutually
exclusive.” Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,862 n.32.
36
Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,055-56.
37
“Comcast’s practice selectively blocks and impedes the use of particular
applications, and we believe that such disparate treatment poses significant risks of
anticompetitive abuse.” Id. at 13,055.
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telecommunications38 component needed to transmit bits and
packets is inseparable from the content those bits contain.39 By
treating the telecommunications component as subordinate,
the Commission could rationalize a semantic distinction
between a carrier providing telecommunications as a
component of an information service and a carrier offering
retail telecommunications services on a standalone basis.40 By
opting to treat the telecommunications function as wholly
38

Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in
the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006).
39
To justify its decision to apply the information-service classification to
services that combine telecommunications transmission and content, the FCC insisted
that the telecommunications component could not be singled out:
[W]e reject arguments that companies using their own facilities to provide
wireline broadband Internet access service simultaneously provide a
telecommunications service to their end user wireline broadband Internet access
customers. The record demonstrates that end users of wireline broadband
Internet access service receive and pay for a single, functionally integrated
service, not two distinct services. This conclusion also is consistent with certain
past Commission pronouncements that the categories of “information service” and
“telecommunications service” are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the fact that the
Commission has, up to now, required facilities-based providers of wireline
broadband Internet access service to separate out a telecommunications
transmission service and make that service available to competitors on a common
carrier basis under the Computer Inquiry regime has no bearing on the nature of
the service wireline broadband Internet access service providers offer their end
user customers. We conclude now, based on the record before us, that wireline
broadband Internet access service is, as discussed above, a functionally
integrated, finished product, rather than both an information service and a
telecommunications service.
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,911 (citations omitted).
40
The Supreme Court accepted the FCC’s determination that cable modem
Internet access constituted an information service:
Cable modem service is not itself and does not include an offering of
telecommunications service to subscribers. We disagree with commenters that
urge us to find a telecommunications service inherent in the provision of cable
modem service. Consistent with the statutory definition of information service,
cable modem service provides the capabilities described above “via
telecommunications.” That telecommunications component is not, however,
separable from the data-processing capabilities of the service. As provided to the
end user the telecommunications is part and parcel of cable modem service and is
integral to its other capabilities.
In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of
proposed rulemaking), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Brand X Internet Servs. v.
FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). See generally Rob Frieden,
Neither Fish nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services,
6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373 (2008); Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and
Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory
Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006).
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integrated into an information-service composite, the FCC
could then abandon conventional common-carrier regulation
required by Title II of the Communications Act.41
In the short term, the Commission championed
regulatory restraint, a laudable goal that arguably contributed
to the Internet’s speedy commercial success.42 However, the
Commission soon discovered that—having given up on a direct
statutory link—it would experience great difficulty in imposing
any lawful safeguards, even when it received complaints of
clearly abusive, discriminatory, and anticompetitive practices
like those undertaken by Comcast.43
The FCC appeared quite confident that it could remedy
any miscalculations and improper deregulation simply by
invoking ancillary jurisdiction to revisit and revise its prior
deregulation if consumer protection and other compelling
circumstances warranted.44 In hindsight, the Commission acted
too summarily both in its decision to deem all forms of Internet
access exempt from Title II oversight and its assumption that it
could readily undo, revise, or reassemble a limited regulatory
regime if necessary.
When faced with instances where it had to remedy a
problem (or make another information-service/telecommunicationsservice determination), the FCC has generated a mixed record. In
some instances reviewing courts have deferred to the Commission’s
41

47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276.
Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52 from Tim Wu, Assoc.
Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford
Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 4 (August 22, 2003), available at
http://www.timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf.
43
See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[T]he
allowance of wide latitude in the exercise of delegated powers is not the equivalent of
untrammeled freedom to regulate activities over which the statute fails to
confer . . . Commission authority.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v.
FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1976))); Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,030-31.
44
The FCC overestimated its ability to apply Title I ancillary jurisdiction to
re-regulate information services after having previously determined that it lacked
statutory authority:
42

The Commission is empowered by statute to weigh these various objectives and
craft regulations that specifically target the relevant features of VoIP and other
IP-enabled services. Where the Act does not prescribe a particular regulatory
treatment, the Commission may have authority to impose requirements under
Title I of the Act. Alternatively, the Commission may forbear from applying
specific provisions. Finally, of course, the Commission is entitled to amend or
revoke its own rules and regulations when the underlying circumstances no
longer apply.
In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863, 4893
(Mar. 10, 2004).
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expertise and affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction45 and rules (e.g.,
requiring VoIP service providers to comply with many conventional
telephone company requirements46) despite the absence of direct
statutory authority under Title II of the Communications Act.
But in other cases, where equally compelling needs existed for
the FCC to provide consumer safeguards, courts have deemed
the Commission to lack sufficient statutory authority to act (e.g.,
sanctioning Comcast for deliberately preventing subscribers
from transmitting and receiving video content via peer-to-peer
traffic streams).47
Having made an unconditional determination that the
information-service, deregulated “safe harbor”48 applies to
Internet access, the Commission could not subsequently
reassert regulatory safeguards—no matter how necessary.
When the FCC determined that only the information-service
classification would apply, the Commission in effect
determined that it had no direct statutory authority to impose
regulatory requirements on telecommunications and other
noninformation services that constitute a part of the blend of
services contained in broadband Internet access. Even if the
FCC could belatedly identify legitimate reasons for its
45

See, e.g., Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., In re IP-Enabled Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (June 3, 2005)
(first report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. Nuvio Corp.
v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring interconnected VoIP service providers
to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); In re Universal Service Contribution
Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518 (June 27, 2006) (report and order and notice of
proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. in relevant part, Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC,
489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (establishing universal service contribution obligations
for interconnected VoIP service providers); In re Implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer
Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information; IP-Enabled
Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 22 FCC Rcd.
6927 (2007) (extending customer proprietary network information obligations to
interconnected VoIP service providers), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecom. Assoc. v.
FCC, 555 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
47
See generally Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
48
A safe harbor constitutes “[a]n area or means of protection [or a] provision
(as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). In light of the lack of a bright line distinction
between regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information
services, ventures can possibly secure a competitive advantage through regulatory
arbitrage where ventures seek reduced regulatory oversight by characterizing
telecommunications services as information services. The FCC defined regulatory
arbitrage as “businesses making decisions based on regulatory classifications rather
than on customers’ preferences and innovative and sustainable business plans.” In re
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities,
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4846 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking). See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in
Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2004).
46
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intervention, the prior determination that cable, DSL,
powerline, and wireless services qualified for deregulated safe
harbors rendered them effectively off limits.49
The FCC wrongly concluded that the broadband
Internet access marketplace was so competitive that no
provider would try to engage in anticompetitive practices. In
reality the broadband marketplace offers limited options to
most U.S. consumers with cable modem and DSL services
predominating.50 Rather than making a proper deregulatory
statutory interpretation, the FCC opined—incorrectly—that
industry self-regulation would force carriers to offer low-cost

49

The Supreme Court rejected the FCC’s attempt to impose limited regulatory
safeguards on information-service providers based on an extension of ancillary jurisdiction:
In this case we must decide whether the Federal Communications Commission
has authority to regulate an Internet service provider’s network management
practices. Acknowledging that it has no express statutory authority over such
practices, the Commission relies on section 4(i) of the Communications Act of
1934, which authorizes the Commission to “perform any and all acts, make such
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter,
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). The
Commission may exercise this “ancillary” authority only if it demonstrates that
its action—here barring Comcast from interfering with its customers’ use of peerto-peer networking applications—is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.” Am. Library Ass’n v.
FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Commission has failed to make that
showing. It relies principally on several Congressional statements of policy, but
under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law statements of policy, by
themselves, do not create “statutorily mandated responsibilities.”
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644.
50
The FCC has overstated the level of broadband competition in the United
States.
Contrary to claims of those who feel the U.S. has “robust broadband competition,”
it is clear that half of the states have a duopoly rather than true competitive
markets. The only question for these states is how much of a market share the top
two providers collectively command. In states such as Ohio and Nevada, where
there is a 30+ percentage gap between the top two providers, some will argue this
is a monopoly. The other contention, that consumers and businesses have a wealth
of options for providers (one industry executive estimated “everyone has at least
four wireless carries, plus cable, satellite” etc.), also has flaws. This is perhaps true
when taking in the nation as a whole, but when analyzed at the state and county
levels which is where in reality the selection of possible providers actually exists,
there are far fewer choices. Even in the most competitive states, the bottom five
competitors have 3% market share or less. These competitors are obviously not
offering services throughout their states, so clearly any remaining providers are
less than a competitive force. Furthermore, if others are adding dial up service
providers to their list of consumer choices, this is disingenuous distraction because
consumers know dial-up is Internet access but it isn’t broadband.
ADAM ELLIOTT & CRAIG SETTLES, THE STATE OF BROADBAND COMPETITION IN
AMERICA—2010 (2010), available at http://gigaom.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/pdfbroadband-competition-research-report-4-22-10-final.pdf.
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rates and refrain from engaging in anticompetitive conduct.51 In
every instance where a regulatory safeguard has appeared
necessary, explicitly or implicitly, for an information service,
the FCC has had to scramble to find a lawful basis to reassert
jurisdiction. This process has forced the FCC to spend countless
hours devising creative and not-always-successful ways to
backtrack from its previously clear and unequivocal
determination. One example is the FCC’s attempt to sanction
Comcast for deliberately interfering with its subscribers’ peerto-peer file transfers, which contained some identical content to
the company’s pay-per-view cable television service.52 The
Commission determined that Comcast did not have legitimate
traffic-management reasons for meddling with subscriber
traffic53 and that the company lacked candor in its
representation of what tactics it had used.54 Notwithstanding
the commonly shared view that Comcast’s conduct justified
FCC investigation and a remedy to safeguard consumers, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FCC’s attempt to
invoke ancillary jurisdiction as the lawful basis for sanctioning
Comcast. The court determined that the FCC lacked a direct
statutory basis for intervening:
In this case the Commission cites . . . [no section in the
Communications Act of 1934] to shed light on any express statutory
delegation of authority found in Title II, III, VI, or, for that matter,
anywhere else. That is, unlike the way it successfully employed
policy statements in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I, the
Commission does not rely on section 230(b) or section 1 to argue that
its regulation of an activity over which it concededly has no express
statutory authority (here Comcast’s Internet management practices)
is necessary to further its regulation of activities over which it does
have express statutory authority (here, for example, Comcast’s
51

Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,884-85 (discussing
sufficiency of intermodal competition and price decline as a result of that competition).
52
“[T]he evidence reviewed above shows that Comcast selectively targeted
and terminated the upload connections of its customers’ peer-to-peer applications and
that this conduct significantly impeded consumers’ ability to access the content and use
the applications of their choice.” Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,054.
Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have become a
competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet users
have the opportunity to view high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might
otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand (“VOD”) service.
Id. at 13,030.
53
Id. at 13,050.
54
“Comcast’s statements in its comments and response to Free Press’s
complaint raise troubling questions about Comcast’s candor during this proceeding.”
Id. at 13,032 n.31.
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management of its Title VI cable services). In this respect, this case
is just like NARUC II. On the record before us, we see “no
relationship whatever,” NARUC II, 533 F.2d [601,] 616, between the
Order and services subject to Commission regulation.55

Faced with a clear rebuke, FCC Chairman Julius
Genachowski attempted to fashion a rationale for subdividing
broadband access so that the Commission could identify and
apply limited regulation of now identifiable telecommunications
This
newfound
severability
of
service
components.56
telecommunications services ran completely counter to the FCC’s
previous rationale used to apply the information-service
classification unconditionally to broadband Internet access. The
Commission
previously
recognized
the
need
for
a
telecommunications link to provide bit-and-packet transmission
across distances; however, the Commission determined that this
component was not a standalone retail service because it was
seamlessly integrated with a predominant information service.57
The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s statutory interpretation,
which served as the basis to treat cable modem Internet access as
an information service.58

55

Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 654.
See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The Third
Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.doc (proposing to
apply Title II regulation only to the bit transmission portion of ISP services and
rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or
reclassifying all aspects of Internet access as a telecommunications service); see also
Austin Schlick, General Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, A Third-Way Legal
Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A1.doc (providing legal
rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over
Internet access).
57
To support its finding that broadband Internet access constitutes an
information service, the FCC subordinated the telecommunications transport function
and emphasized the nature of what content subscribers receive:
56

Thus, whether a telecommunications service is being provided turns on what the
entity is “offering . . . to the public,” and customers’ understanding of that service.
End users subscribing to wireline broadband Internet access service expect to
receive (and pay for) a finished, functionally integrated service that provides
access to the Internet. End users do not expect to receive (or pay for) two distinct
services—both Internet access service and a distinct transmission service, for
example. Thus, the transmission capability is part and parcel of, and integral to,
the Internet access service capabilities. Accordingly, we conclude that wireline
broadband Internet access service does not include the provision of a
telecommunications service to the end user irrespective of how the service provider
may decide to offer the transmission component to other service providers.
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,910-11.
58
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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This newfound ability to segregate and identify a new
telecommunications component to Internet access service is a
scramble and a stretch. Previously, the Commission conveniently
and expediently argued no such segregation could occur. The FCC
subsequently abandoned this strategy and now asserts that it can
still intervene and respond to complaints about ISP conduct based
on other creative and novel interpretations of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended.59
Ostensibly structured to offer an acceptable compromise,
the FCC issued a Report and Order that imposes basic publicinterest obligations on ISPs,60 including four principles established
in a 2005 statement61 and requirements that ISPs operate with
transparency, nondiscrimination, and a commitment not to block
lawful traffic.62 The Commission identified exceptions for
reasonable network management,63 specialized services,64 and
59

In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (Dec. 23, 2010)
(report and order) [hereinafter Open Internet Report and Order]; see also In re
Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064 (Oct. 22, 2009) (notice of proposed
rulemaking) [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM].
60
Specifically, the FCC imposed rules on the providers of broadband Internet
access service, defined as a
mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints,
including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term
also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a
functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is
used to evade the protections set forth in this Part.
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,932.
61
In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (Sept. 23, 2005) (policy statement).
62
The FCC attempts to couch its open access initiative as consistent with
prior bipartisan actions:
[W]e adopt three basic rules that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms,
as well as our own prior decisions: i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband
providers must disclose the network management practices, performance
characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services; ii. No
blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications,
services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful
websites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony
services; and iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,906.
63
“A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and
tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account
the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access
service.” Id. at 17,952 (differentiating between reasonable network management
practices that could affect how subscribers access content and unreasonable
discriminatory practices).
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wireless access.65 Notwithstanding its prior decision to apply the
information-service classification that requires the FCC to eschew
regulatory oversight, the Commission emphasized that the publicinterest duty to ensure an open Internet required it to establish
clear and certain rules applicable to both fixed (i.e., wire-based)
and mobile (i.e., wireless) ISPs.66
Having faced instances where it saw the need to
intervene and resolve complaints about unfair and
anticompetitive practices of a major national ISP, the FCC
presented compelling arguments to impose public-interest
safeguards.67 But in concluding that retail ISPs operate as
information-service providers, the Commission acted on the
assumption that an ISP like Comcast would never engage in
such practices because robust competition would punish such
self-serving conduct with substantial customer migration to
alternative carriers promising not to interfere with customers’
broadband traffic.
The FCC’s Open Internet Report and Order would
obligate all ISPs to “disclose [their] network management
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and
64

“‘[S]pecialized services,’ such as some broadband providers’ existing
facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband
Internet access service . . . .” Id. at 17,965.
We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of broadband Internet
access services, with a particular focus on any signs that specialized services are in
any way retarding the growth of or constricting capacity available for broadband
Internet access service. We fully expect that broadband providers will increase
capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if they expand network
capacity to accommodate specialized services. We would be concerned if capacity
for broadband Internet access service did not keep pace. We also expect broadband
providers to disclose information about specialized services’ impact, if any, on lastmile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access
service. We may consider additional disclosure requirements in this area in our
related proceeding regarding consumer transparency and disclosure.
Id. at 17,966.
65
Despite the likelihood that wireless network access will grow and perhaps
become the primary way people access the Internet, the FCC established relaxed antiblocking rules based on spectrum and operational limitations not applicable to wirebased networks.
A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service,
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing
lawful websites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such
person block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.
Id. at 17,959.
66
Id. at 17,908.
67
See id.
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conditions of their broadband services.”68 The FCC adopted
different requirements for fixed and broadband providers on
the other two key requirements. Fixed providers may not
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network
traffic, nor can they block lawful content, applications, services,
or nonharmful devices.69 Mobile broadband providers may not
block access to lawful websites or applications that compete
with their voice or video services.70
The Report and Order rejects assertions that network
neutrality71 requirements would stifle innovation, reduce
68

Id. at 17,906.

A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such
services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop,
market, and maintain Internet offerings.
Id. at 17,937.
69
“A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content,
applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network
management.” Id. at 17,942.
70
Id. at 17,959-60.
71
Network neutrality refers to the imposition of nondiscrimination,
transparency, and other requirements on ISPs. The requirements are designed to
foster a level, competitive playing field among content providers and to establish
consumer safeguards so that Internet users have access limited only by legitimate
concerns such as ISP network management and national security. See Rob Frieden, A
Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUR. ECON. POL’Y 4, 5 (2008).
See generally Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding ContentBased Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Dan G. Barry,
The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP
Convergence Mean that It Is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation?, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421 (2008); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard,
Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L.,
No. 6, 1 (Dec. 2008); Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality
and its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 153 (2008); T. Randolph Beard et al., Network Neutrality and Industry
Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2007); Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A
Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 1 (2007); Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to
the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 461 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network
Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2007); Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van
Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A
Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo,
Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM.
L.J. 575 (2007); Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of Net
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2007); Randolph J. May,
Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, I/S: A J. L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 197 (2007); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Justice, and Only
Justice, You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s
Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); Howard A.
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incentives to invest in network infrastructure, and hamper
employment in the Internet economy:
We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of
reasonable network management, will empower and protect
consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet
continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid
innovation at both the core and the edge of the network. This is
consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband
access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global
competitiveness of the United States.72

Despite the strident dissents from the two Republican
Commissioners, the Report and Order appears to emphasize
that the final rules logically follow from the nonpartisan
consensus reached in documents created in 2005 and 2007.73
Further, the Report and Order claims that the requirements do

Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions Than Answers, 6 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2007); Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality
to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY.
L. REV. 483 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of
Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103 (2006); William G. Laxton, Jr.,
The End of Net Neutrality, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. NO. 15; Lawrence Lessig, In
Support of Network Neutrality, I/S: A J. ON L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 185 (2007); J.
Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the
Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 349 (2006); Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates
Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model,
3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network
Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating
Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End
Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2003); Mark A. Lemley
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in
the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
72
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,906.
73
The FCC attempts to frame the Open Internet Report and Order as
noncontroversial and a lawful exercise of statutory authority:
The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt today
follow directly from the Commission’s bipartisan Internet Policy Statement,
adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily enforceable for certain
broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness protections the Commission
established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry
in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a
principle of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build
upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers to be
transparent in their network management practices, so that end users can make
informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internetbased offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and
discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that
depend on or connect to the Internet.
Id. at 17,907-08 (citations omitted).
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not violate the Constitution,74 particularly First Amendment
expression rights of ISPs75 and the prohibition on government
takings in the Fifth Amendment.76
Additionally, the Report and Order extensively attempts
to demonstrate that the FCC has lawful jurisdiction to
promulgate network neutrality rules, primarily because
Congress, in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act,77
authorized the FCC to take all reasonable steps to promote
widespread access to the Internet.78 In light of the Comcast
case, the Commission must establish clear and direct statutory
authority to impose new rules.79 The Commission heavily relied
on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act,80 which does not
explicitly authorize regulation and rule making.81 The FCC
inferred that the duty to encourage the deployment of
“advanced telecommunications capability” authorizes the
Commission to use whatever tools it considers necessary to
achieve timely progress.82
The FCC’s assumption of statutory authority requires
two
novel
reinterpretations
of
the
definition
of
telecommunications contained in the Communications Act.
First, the FCC has to consider advanced telecommunications
capability to include Internet access,83 despite having
74

See id. at 17,981-87.
See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How
Internet Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral
Conduits, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1314-15 (2010).
76
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,985.
77
Section 706 is reproduced in the notes to Section 157 of the
Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 157 notes (2006).
78
See Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,966-81.
79
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
80
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,968.
81
See 47 U.S.C. § 1302.
82
The FCC inferred that Section 706 of the 1996 Act confers broad authority
to revise the scope of regulatory oversight to promote Internet access:
75

As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state
commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of “advanced
telecommunications capability.” . . . Under Section 706(a), the Commission must
encourage the deployment of such capability by “utilizing, in a manner consistent
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” various tools including
“measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.”
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,968.
83
“‘[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,’ as defined in the statute,
includes broadband Internet access.” Id. at 17,968 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1)
(defining “advanced telecommunications capability” as “high-speed, switched,
broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any
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previously concluded that the technologies providing such
access constitute information services that only integrate
telecommunications (but do not constitute telecommunications
services in and of themselves). The Commission previously
determined that the telecommunications transmission of bits
and packets in Internet access is not severable from the
predominant information service offered, but instead provided
as a subordinate part of an information service that an ISP
offers to end users.84 Second, the FCC now has to elevate the
significance of the telecommunications bit-transmission
function in Internet access85 to trigger public-interest concerns
about competition and anticompetitive practices, even though
the Commission had previously qualified Internet-access
technologies for an unregulated safe harbor status. Now the
FCC wants to validate the telecommunications component as
the driver for public-interest regulatory safeguards.
Despite having previously concluded that the broadband
marketplace was robustly competitive and close to ubiquitous,
the Commission cited to better-calibrated market penetration
data to support its involvement:
Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to take
actions such as enforcing open Internet principles. It directs the
technology”)); In re A National Broadband Plan for our Future, 24 FCC Rcd. 4342, 434546 (Apr. 8, 2009) (notice of inquiry). “The term ‘advanced telecommunications capability’
is defined, without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any
technology.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1); see also id. at n.19. (“advanced telecommunications
capability” includes broadband Internet access); In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment
of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, 2400 (Jan. 28, 1999)
(report) (Section 706 addresses “the deployment of broadband capability”).
84
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 977-78 (2005).
85
Note that before the FCC deregulated Internet access, the Commission
considered it possible to separate the telecommunications component:
We conclude that advanced services are telecommunications services. The
Commission has repeatedly held that specific packet-switched services are “basic
services,” that is to say, pure transmission services. xDSL and packet switching are
simply
transmission
technologies. . . . An
end-user
may
utilize
a
telecommunications service together with an information service, as in the case of
Internet access. In such a case, however, we treat the two services separately: the
first service is a telecommunications service (e.g., the xDSL-enabled transmission
path), and the second service is an information service, in this case Internet access.
In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, 24,029-30 (Aug. 6, 1998) (memorandum and opinion
and order, and notice of proposed rulemaking).
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Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the
availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans and requires that, if the Commission finds that such
capability is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion,
it “shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such
capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by
promoting competition in the telecommunications market.” In July
2010, the Commission “conclude[d] that broadband deployment to all
Americans is not reasonable and timely” and noted that “[a]s a
consequence of that conclusion,” Section 706(b) was triggered.
Section 706(b) therefore provides express authority for the proinvestment, pro-competition rules we adopt today.86

Additionally, the FCC applied portions of Titles II, III,
and VI of the Communications Act to ISPs despite the fact that
Title II customarily applies to common carriers, Title III to
broadcasters and wireless carriers, and Title VI to cable
television operators.87 Instead of stating that ISPs operate as
telecommunications service carriers when they provide
essential first and last-mile access to the Internet—a scenario
suggested by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski and now
apparently rejected—the Report and Order states that because
some Internet-based services compete with traditional
telephone, broadcast, and video services, the Commission has
jurisdiction to impose rules and regulations to prevent
anticompetitive practices and to promote competition.88
The FCC justified the imposition of network neutrality
rules on ISPs with the conclusion that ISPs have the incentive
and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices that limit
Internet openness in terms of content, applications, services,
and devices accessed over, or connected to, broadband Internet
access services.89 The Commission provided three examples
suggesting that ISPs may have incentives to block or degrade
content that competes with what the ISP or an affiliate offers,
to impose surcharges on competing content providers in
addition to end user subscription fees, and to degrade
competitors’ traffic:
[1] [B]roadband providers may have economic incentives to block or
otherwise disadvantage specific edge providers or classes of edge
providers, for example by controlling the transmission of network
traffic over a broadband connection, including the price and quality
of access to end users. A broadband provider might use this power to
86
87
88
89

Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,972.
Id. at 17,972-80.
Id.
Id. at 17,907.
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benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated
offerings.90
....
[2] [B]roadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues
by charging edge providers, who already pay for their own
connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized access to end
users. Although broadband providers have not historically imposed
such fees, they have argued they should be permitted to do so. A
broadband provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently
high fees because that broadband provider is typically an edge
provider’s only option for reaching a particular end user. Thus
broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers.91
....
[3] [I]f broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers for
prioritized access to end users, they will have an incentive to
degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they provide
to non-prioritized traffic. This would increase the gap in quality
(such as latency in transmission) between prioritized access and nonprioritized access, induce more edge providers to pay for prioritized
access, and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for
prioritized access. Even more damaging, broadband providers might
withhold or decline to expand capacity in order to “squeeze” nonprioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of
network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice
between accepting low-quality transmission or paying fees for
prioritized access to end users.92

The FCC considers the three examples of discrimination
as more than theoretical in light of actual examples where
ISPs, such as Comcast, have blocked or degraded traffic
without legitimate network management concerns.93 Similarly,
90

Id. at 17,915.
Id. at 17,919.
92
Id. at 17,922.
93
Content providers also may have the ability and incentive to interfere with end
user Internet access. For example, to bolster its negotiation leverage with Cablevision on the
amount of compensation due for the right to retransmit broadcast television content, Fox
briefly blocked Cablevision broadband subscribers from accessing the company’s content
made available via Hulu’s website. Fox used packet-interrogation techniques to identify
which content requests made via the Hulu web site originated from Cablevision subscribers.
See Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast’s Actions,
BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 29, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20101129006456/en/Level-3-Communications-Issues-Statement-Comcast%E2%80%99sActions; Letter from Joseph W. Waz, Jr., Senior Vice President, External Affairs & Pub.
Policy Counsel & Lynn R. Charytan, Vice President, Legal Regulatory Affairs, Comcast, to
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/About/PressRoom/Documents/Comcastexparte11
30.pdf; see also Joe Waz, 20 Q’s—with Accurate A’s—About Level 3’s Peering Dispute,
COMCAST VOICES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://blog.comcast.com/2010/12/20-qs---with-accurate-as--91
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the Commission has stated that the benefits in guarding
against such anticompetitive practices outweigh the costs.94
The FCC’s latest attempt to circumvent its informationservice classification of broadband Internet access may not
pass muster with a reviewing court.95 The Commission avoided
repeating the Title I ancillary jurisdiction strategy as well as
Chairman Genachowski’s proposed surgical removal of
telecommunications-service
elements
from
information
services. But the Commission has come up with similarly
triangulating strategies: Title III confers broad authority for
the FCC to impose any necessary safeguard over spectrumusing services—arguably including wireless broadband96—and
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 both
encourages and authorizes any well-articulated rationale for
regulating information services, which promotes wider access
to broadband services.97
Had the FCC acknowledged years ago that public access to
information services might trigger conflicts not readily resolved
by the marketplace, the Commission would have been able to
retain limited and nonintrusive jurisdiction to respond to
complaints. Telecommunications and information markets and
technologies have converged, and it is now more difficult for the
FCC to determine the exact scope of its lawful jurisdiction and the
line between regulated telecommunications services and
unregulated information services. Rather than acknowledge the
about-level-3s-peering-dispute.html; Level 3 Releases Statement to Clarify Issues in
Comcast/Level3 Interconnection Dispute, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 3, 2010, 9:13 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101203005375/en/Level-3-Releases-StatementClarify-Issues-ComcastLevel.
94
The FCC attempted to downplay the significance of its order and the
burdens it imposed:
By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the costs associated
with the open Internet rules adopted here are likely small. Broadband providers
generally endorse openness norms—including the transparency and no blocking
principles—as beneficial and in line with current and planned business practices
(though they do not uniformly support rules making them enforceable) Even to
the extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband providers’
practices, the costs of compliance should be modest.
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,928.
95
Notice of Appeal, Verizon v. FCC (No. 11-1355) (D.C. Cir. 2011). A previous
appeal was dismissed as premature/unripe because the final rules had not appeared in
the Federal Register. Verizon v. FCC, Nos. 11–1014, 11–1016, 2011 WL 1235523 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 4, 2011).
96
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (applying regulations to wireless
commercial mobile radio service operators using Title III that generally address
broadcast spectrum use).
97
See id. § 1302.
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need to make ad hoc determinations and to resolve conflicts, the
Commission blithely assumed that a competitive marketplace
would provide solutions to consumers and remedies to any and all
problems. Such reliance comes across as misguided, particularly
in light of the conflicts the FCC has faced involving Internet
access and how to justify its intervention.
Ironically, even as the FCC appears to have abandoned
oversight of information services completely, it has devised a
judicially approved model for asserting jurisdiction over a new
hybrid service that combines telecommunications and
information services: VoIP. The Commission has established an
extensive body of decisions on what obligations VoIP service
providers must undertake to serve the public interest. Bear in
mind that many of these obligations impose significant costs on
VoIP carriers, thereby reducing their competitiveness and
ability to offer a cheaper alternative to existing wired and
wireless services. Although VoIP arguably constitutes a type of
information service,98 the FCC has managed to avoid having to
make that determination even as the Commission requires
VoIP operators to incur the same obligations as Title II–
regulated common-carrier telephone companies.99 VoIP service
providers that can receive or deliver calls to conventional wired
and wireless networks must contribute to universal service
funding programs designed to promote affordable dial-up
telephone service;100 make arrangements to support subscriber

98

VoIP customers initiate and receive calls via their broadband links, e.g.,
DSL and cable modem services. The FCC considers broadband access an information
service. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice
of proposed rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3. It
follows that software and other applications carried via information-service links
similarly qualify as information services.
99
The FCC has managed to avoid making a specific regulatory classification
of VoIP, despite having imposed Title II regulatory requirements:
To date, the Commission has not classified interconnected VoIP service as
either an information service or a telecommunications service. The
Commission has, however, extended certain obligations to providers of such
service, including local number portability, 911 emergency calling capability,
universal service contribution, CPNI protection, disability access and TRS
contribution requirements, and section 214 discontinuance obligations.
In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4582 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice of proposed
rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted).
100
In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7538
(June 27, 2006) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending
section 254(d) permissive authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to
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access to emergency 911 service;101 cooperate with law
incorporate
the
technical
enforcement
authorities;102
103
accommodations for persons with disabilities, such as deaf
callers; support the ability of existing subscribers to keep their
existing telephone numbers when switching services;104 and
report service outages to the Commission. 105
The FCC can impose consumer-oriented safeguards on
VoIP service providers based on a more persuasive and betterarticulated assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. Because VoIP
competes with conventional wired and wireless services subject to
Title II regulation, the Commission can impose the very same
requirements on VoIP carriers despite the lack of specific Title II
authority.106 Reviewing courts have affirmed the Commission’s
jurisdiction as well as its preemption of the states from imposing
a different regulatory regime, or none at all.107 But success in
selectively regulating VoIP service does not extend to other
information services because a less-direct impact on a regulated
service exists and also because of the FCC’s summary conclusion
that all information services qualify for deregulation.
B.

Eliminating Common Carrier Duties

The FCC has streamlined and even deregulated some
telecommunications services based on criteria contained in the
contribute to the USF), reh’g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding
Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
101
In re IP-Enabled Servs., 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (June 3, 2005) (first report
and order and notice of proposed rulemaking).
102
In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband
Access & Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,989 (Sept. 23, 2005) (first report and order and
further notice of proposed rulemaking).
103
In re IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 11,275 (June 15, 2007) (report and
order); In re IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 18,319 (Oct. 9, 2007) (order and public
notice seeking comment) (granting in part and denying in part waivers of the FCC
order); see also In re Contributions to the Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, 26
FCC Rcd. 3285 (Mar. 3, 2011).
104
In re Telephone Number Requirements for IP Enabled Services Providers,
22 FCC Rcd. 19,531 (Nov. 8, 2007) (report and order, declaratory ruling, order on
remand, and notice of proposed rulemaking); In re Matters of Local Number Portability
Porting Interval and Validation, 25 FCC Rcd. 6953 (May 20, 2010) (report and order)
(establishing short deadlines for conversions).
105
The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage
Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and Broadband
Internet Service Providers, PS Docket No. 11-82, FCC 12-22 (Feb. 21, 2012) (report and
order), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-22A1.doc.
106
In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4582 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice
of proposed rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted).
107
Vonage Holding Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993,
994 (D. Minn. 2003) (upholding FCC preemption of state VoIP regulation).
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Telecommunications Act108 and, more broadly, in light of
expanded competition. In many instances the Commission
wisely has forborne from applying conventional “command and
control,” “heavy-handed” regulation in light of carriers’ ability
to self-regulate and consumers’ ability to pursue service
options.109 However, the Commission has accelerated the
deregulatory glide path in some market segments based on
wishful thinking and flawed assessments of the robustness and
sustainability of competition.110 The markets for equipment,111
108

Section 10 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 160 (2006), requires the FCC to forbear from any statutory provision or regulation if
the Commission determines that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement
of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers;
and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with
the public interest.
47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006). In making such determinations, the Commission must also
consider “whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote
competitive market conditions.” Id. § 160(b). Section 160(d) specifies, however, that
“[e]xcept as provided in section 251(f) . . . the Commission may not forbear from
applying the requirements of section 251(c) or 271 . . . until it determines that those
requirements have been fully implemented.” Id. § 160(d). Section 332(c) of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c), authorizes the Commission to refrain or
forbear from enforcing any provision other than the core requirements of sections 201,
202, and 208, which respectively require just and reasonable charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations, prohibit unreasonable discrimination and carrier
practices, and require the FCC to investigate complaints.
109
See Earthlink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming the FCC’s
decision to forbear from imposing most local loop unbundling requirements on incumbent
carriers); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the
FCC’s nationwide decision to refrain from requiring § 251 unbundling fiber broadband
elements and reversing the Commission’s decision not to eliminate other unbundling
requirements in light if the adverse impact on carrier investment incentives).
110
The FCC previously did not even require applicants for regulatory
forbearance to demonstrate how marketplace conditions specifically supported less
government oversight:
We acknowledge that we have not previously required petitioners to specify in the
petition how the requested relief meets each of the three forbearance criteria, and
that a requirement to do so will burden applicants to the extent that they must
develop their supporting arguments in advance of filing. We do not, however,
consider this an unreasonable expectation, and we find that the benefit to both
commenters and the Commission of clarity and precision outweighs the burden on
the petitioner of explaining how forbearance from each regulation or statutory
provision meets each prong.
In re Petition to Establish Procedural Requirements to Govern Proceedings for Forbearance
Under Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 24 FCC Rcd. 9543, 9551
(June 29, 2009) (report and order) [hereinafter Forbearance Criteria Order].
111
In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (June 26, 1968) (decision); In re Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204
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wiring located on customers’ premises,112 and long-distance
telephone services113 provide clear examples of prudent
regulatory streamlining. But similar initiatives for the first-,
last-, and middle-mile services114 that link end users with major
(Feb. 5, 1974), aff’d sub nom. N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976); In
re Mebane Home Telephone Co., 53 F.C.C.2d 473, 474 (June 4, 1975), aff’d sub nom.
Mebane Home Tel. Co. v. FCC, 535 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Pub. Util. Comm’n
of Tex. v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting long established FCC policy that
carriers and non-carriers alike have a federal right to interconnect to the public telephone
network in ways that are privately beneficial if they are not publicly detrimental).
Previous FCC opposition to this principle failed to pass muster with a reviewing court
that interpreted the Communications Act as mandating the right of consumers to attach
equipment to the network in ways that were privately beneficial but not publicly harmful.
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). “The intervenors’
tariffs [prohibiting the use of a plastic device to enhance privacy and low volume
conversations], under the Commission’s decision, are in [sic] unwarranted interference
with the telephone subscriber’s right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are
privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.” Id. at 269.
112
In re Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring,
Second Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 8498 (Mar. 12, 1986).
113
“In recent years, the FCC has sought to facilitate greater competition in
the provision of both long-distance and local telephone service.” WorldCom, Inc. v.
FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing AT&T v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Nat’l Rural Telecom
Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also In re Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (Nov. 28, 1980) (first report and order); In re MTS and WATS
Market Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (Feb. 28, 1983) (report and order); In re Access
Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rcd. 12,962 (May 31, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
remanded in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313 (5th
Cir. 2001); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (Jan. 16, 1981).
114
The FCC categorizes Internet access into three types based on
geographical location and function:
Today, the Internet has evolved from its early stages and is comprised of three
types of interconnected networks. The first category, Backbone Providers, supply
long-distance high-speed “connections between a small number of interconnection
points.” Second, there are Middle-Mile Providers who supply regional distributive
functions; for example, a connection from a Backbone Provider to a distant city’s
central office maintained by an ISP. Finally, there are Last-Mile Providers who
connect Middle-Mile Providers to end users (consumers). Although ISPs were
historically considered Last-Mile Providers, it is often the case for broadband
capable networks that the ISP is both the Last-Mile Provider and the Middle-Mile
Provider. This system of connected networks is most analogous to a road system:
Backbones represent interstate highways; Middle-Mile networks are the
intrastate highways; and Last-Mile networks are the local roads that ultimately
reach consumers.
Cody Vitello, Network Neutrality Generates Contentious Debate Among Experts: Should
Consumers Be Worried?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 513, 518 (2010) (citations omitted).
Middle-mile facilities are shared assets for all types of last-mile access. As such,
the cost analysis is very similar regardless of last-mile infrastructure. The local
aggregation point can vary based on technology (e.g., a cable headend, LEC
central office or a wireless mobile switching center (MSC)) while the Internet
gateway is a common asset. Middle-mile facilities are widely deployed but can be
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broadband
long-haul
networks
exemplify
premature
abandonment of regulatory safeguards in light of the onset of
little competition, particularly in rural areas.115
expensive in rural areas because of the difficulties of achieving local scale, thereby
increasing the investment gap. On a per-unit basis, middle-mile costs are high in
rural areas due to long distances and low aggregate demand when compared to
middle-mile cost economics in urban areas. While there may be a significant
affordability problem with regard to middle-mile access, it is not clear that there
is a middle-mile fiber deployment gap.
In re Connect America Fund, 25 FCC Rcd. 6657, 6842 (Apr. 21, 2010) (notice of inquiry
and notice of proposed rulemaking).
115
The FCC’s conclusions about broadband competitiveness has generated
substantial opposition:
The course the Commission has followed over the past eight years has turned out
to be spectacularly wrong in all of those aspects. There is little to no competition
for broadband services in the residential and “middle mile” markets. As a result,
U.S. consumers pay higher rates for services with slower speeds than do
consumers in other industrialized nations. Our record of online innovation has
slowed to a crawl. The U.S.’s standing in the world ranking of broadband adoption
falls continually. (One can look at various rankings and dispute any given
position, but the trend in all of them is clear. America is clearly falling behind.)
Public Knowledge, Media Access Project, The New America Foundation & U.S. PIRG,
Comments In re A National Broadband Plan for our Future, in Practising Law Inst.,
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 993
PLI/Pat 149, 176-77 (2010).
The reason the U.S. is falling behind can be traced directly to the decisions the
Commission made over the past 10 years to reclassify broadband service, taking it
out of the environment of Title II while moving it into the more legally murky
area of Title I by classifying broadband as an “information service” instead of as a
“telecommunications service.” Now is the time to recognize that this deliberate
decision to deregulate by redefinition failed to produce the promised land of
“intermodal competition” and reverse that decision.
Id. at 177.
Rural broadband networks are fundamentally similar to broadband networks in
other areas in that, in order to have broadband access to the Internet, they must
include local access, or last-mile, broadband access to the end user and backhaul,
or middle-mile, capabilities to an available Internet peering point. The last-mile
network connects residential and business end users to a local ISP. In this
configuration, the middle-mile or backhaul component connects the local ISP to
an Internet peering point or node. In rural settings, either or both of these
components may not support robust broadband connectivity.
Rural Broadband Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 12,791, 12,828 (Oct. 19, 2009) (public notice)
(citations omitted); cf. Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903, 908
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (deferring to the FCC’s expertise in deeming middle mile markets
sufficiently competition). But see also Data Requested in Special Access NPRM, 25 FCC
Rcd. 15,146 (Oct. 28, 2010) (public notice) (seeking more data about the nature and
scope of middle mile competition); In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local
Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC Rcd. 1994, 1995 (Jan. 31, 2005) (order and notice of
proposed rulemaking); Parties Asked to Refresh Record in the Special Access Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd. 13,352 (July 9, 2007); Parties Asked to Comment
on Analytical Framework Necessary to Resolve Issues in the Special Access NPRM, 24
FCC Rcd. 13,638, 13,639 (Nov. 5, 2009) (public notice).
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In three instances of streamlined regulatory oversight
discussed below, the FCC eliminated statutory duties to deal,
which, in turn, short-circuited both the prospect for true
facilities-based competition and effective judicial review.116 In
its zeal to eliminate common-carrier regulations, based on a
questionable finding of robust and sustainable competition, the
FCC has abandoned requirements that local exchange carriers:
(1) provide market entrants interconnection with their
switching and routing facilities on congressionally mandated
favorable terms and conditions;117 (2) separate their basic
transmission
facilities
from
services
that
provide
118
enhancements to these basic transmission links; and (3)
refrain from offering end-user retail services at rates below the
wholesale rate offered other carriers.119
In all three instances the FCC eliminated regulatory
requirements based on the view that they were not needed to
ensure that consumers could acquire diverse services at
competitive rates. After failing to convince the FCC that such
streamlining did not serve the public interest, consumer
advocates and recent market entrants were similarly
unsuccessful at convincing appellate courts that the Commission
erred in its fact finding.120 On two separate occasions the Supreme
Court has stated clearly that if the FCC determines that no
regulatory safeguards are necessary, then reviewing courts
116

See infra Part II.B.3.
In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 16,983 (Aug. 21, 2003), vacated and
remanded in part, aff’d in part, U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir.
2004); In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2534 (Feb. 4,
2005) (order on remand).
118
In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 385-86 (May 2, 1980) (final
decision), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198
(D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules &
Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 962 (June 16, 1986) (report
and order), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on
remand, In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards,
6 FCC Rcd. 174 (Dec. 17, 1990) (notice of proposed rulemaking and order), rule
modification, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (1991), vacated in part and remanded, California v.
FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, In re Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, 10 FCC Rcd.
5692 (Apr. 25, 1995) (order).
119
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,868; Pac. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 439-40 (2009) (inferring no duty to
deal based on FCC determination of sufficient broadband competition).
120
For example, a reviewing court did not question the FCC’s conclusion that
a sufficiently competitive market existed for telecommunications services linking end
users with ISPs and other service providers. Ad Hoc Telecomm. Users Comm. v. FCC,
572 F.3d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
117
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should not second guess the Commission and therefore should not
apply a more rigorous antitrust standard or duty to deal.121 Thus,
if the FCC overstates the competitiveness and regulatory
capability of telecommunications-service markets, recent case
precedent states that appellate courts will not correct the
Commission’s mistakes but instead summarily validate the
Commission’s determination that such carriers have no duty to
deal with other carriers.
1. Abandonment of Local Loop Unbundling
The Telecommunications Act of 1996122 sought to
stimulate local exchange service competition by creating a
combination of specific common-carrier responsibilities on
telecommunications carriers123 with additional requirements on
the Bell Telephone companies that were spun off from AT&T in
1984.124 In exchange for satisfying a fourteen-point competitive
checklist,125 the spun-off Bell Telephone companies could seek
FCC authorization to provide long-distance telephone services,
a line of business prohibited since AT&T’s divestiture.126
Included in that list was a requirement that they provide
network access on an à la carte or combined basis at rates well
below what the incumbent carriers would seek to charge even
at wholesale.127 Congress hoped that the Bell companies’ entry

121

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 410 (2004); Linkline, 555 U.S. at 450.
122
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996).
123
47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (duties applicable to all telecommunications
carriers). 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(3) requires all telecommunications to
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section
252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.
124

47 U.S.C. § 271 (duties that the Bell telephone companies must satisfy to
qualify for the opportunity to pursue prohibited lines of business such as most long
distance telephone services).
125
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 Section 271 Long Distance Application
Summary of 14 Point Competitive Checklist, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Common_Carrier/News_Releases/1999/nrc9101b.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
126
Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
127
The Supreme Court did not dispute the right of Congress to require the
FCC to create new rate-setting methods with an eye toward expediting market entry in
the local exchange marketplace:
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into long-distance services would further stimulate competition
in that market. Congress also believed that the interconnection
requirements imposed on these carriers would jump-start local
service competition.128 But over time, the Bell companies faced a
robustly competitive long-distance telephone service market
with low margins and less-than-desired upside business
opportunities.129 The mandated promotional pricing of local
exchange facilities stimulated market entry by new competitive
local exchange carriers (CLECs), but sustainable, long-term
competition by facilities-based carriers did not result.130
The Act thus appears to be an explicit disavowal of the familiar public-utility
model of rate regulation (whether in its fair-value or cost-of-service incarnations)
presumably still being applied by many States for retail sales, see In re
Implementation of Local Competition in Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,857, ¶ 704 (1996) (First Report and Order), in favor of novel
ratesetting designed to give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter
local retail telephone markets, short of confiscating the incumbents’ property.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 489 (2002).
128
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required incumbent local exchange
carriers to cooperate with market entrants.
Until the 1990’s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. States
typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area to a local
exchange carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires
connecting telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their
destinations), and the transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches)
that constitute a local exchange network. Technological advances, however, have
made competition among multiple providers of local service seem possible, and
Congress recently ended the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act), Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56, fundamentally restructures local telephone markets. States may no longer
enforce laws that impede competition, and incumbent LECs are subject to a host
of duties intended to facilitate market entry.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Pub. Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
129
The long distance toll service marketplace has become robustly competitive
with low profit margins.
Until the 1970s, AT&T had a virtual monopoly on long distance service in the
United States. In the 1970s, competitors such as MCI and Sprint began also to
offer long distance service. With the gradual emergence of competition, basic rates
dropped, calling surged, and AT&T’s dominance declined. More than 1,900 toll
companies now offer long distance service of which more than 1,400 are wireline
carriers. These carriers remain subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. The
Commission, however, has chosen to rely on competition, rather than regulation,
as much as possible. Thus, the Commission forbears from regulating most aspects
of long distance service.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM., INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV. WIRELINE COMPETITION
BUREAU, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, 2010 WL 3806371 (2010) (tracking declining
revenues and increased competition for inter-LATA toll service).
130
Legislative and FCC attempts to promote local exchange competition failed:
It was both the intent of Congress and the target of intense and sustained FCC
efforts to open up the incumbent local exchange carriers’ (ILECs) local access lines
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Frustrated by the combination of low long-distance
margins and the ongoing duty to bolster the market share of
newcomers, incumbent carriers sought judicial relief. Initially,
even the Supreme Court favored the FCC’s interpretation of
the ‘96 Act’s requirements. The Court determined that the FCC
could lawfully require promotional pricing that used a costing
model which justified access prices well below existing
wholesale rates131 instead of actual, current, and alreadyincurred costs. Similarly, the Court held that such mandatorily
low interconnection rates did not constitute an unconstitutional
taking of incumbent-carrier property because the carriers
never proved that any undertaking resulted in a financial loss,
only less-than-desired financial gains.132 However, the Court
and other lower appellate tribunals later agreed that the FCC’s
interconnection pricing mandate lacked sufficient calibration to
ensure that the promotional pricing only occurred where
absolutely necessary to jump-start competition.133 As time
to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) who could then compete against
the ILECs for “last mile” services without having to build their own access lines.
Seldom have the forces of public policy in telecommunications been as powerfully
aligned as they were on the issue of local-loop unbundling. And yet, the effort was a
failure-the evidence for which is the demise of the CLECs. The reasons for this
failure are clear: (i) the interface between the regulated monopoly owning the localaccess line and the CLECs who wished to use it was highly complex; and (ii) the
ILECs not only owned the local loops, they also competed in the retail market for
access services with the very CLECs who had to use their facilities. The result was
that ILECs had every incentive to make life miserable for the CLECs in any way
they could, and the complexity of the interface gave them plenty of opportunity.
Gerald R. Faulhaber, Will Access Regulation Work?, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 40-41 (2008).
131
Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 535 U.S. at 468-69.
132
In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court rejected
ILECs’ arguments that using a theoretical, most-efficient-cost model, instead of actual
historical costs, constituted a taking that violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court
noted that no party had disputed any specific rate established by the FCC’s forwardlooking, long-run incremental cost-pricing methodology, and concluded that
“[r]egulatory bodies required to set [just and reasonable] rates . . . have ample
discretion to choose methodology.” Id. at 499. Additionally the Court stated that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not specifically require historical costs,
particularly in light of its explicit prohibition on the use of conventional “‘rate-of-return
or other rate-based proceeding’ . . . which has been identified with historical cost ever
since Hope Natural Gas was decided.” Id. at 499-500; see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (largely upholding the FCC’s implementation of the
Congressional mandate contained in Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 as a reasonable exercise of its rulemaking authority, including its requirement
that ILECs unbundle network elements and offer CLECs the opportunity to pick and
choose from an à la carte menu or platform of elements).
133
See, e.g., United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (rejecting the FCC’s local exchange network unbundling requirements as
insufficiently calibrated); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-85 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (again reversing the FCC for failing to create local requirements based on the
specific level of local competition).
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passed, and as many market entrants did not fully migrate
from reselling incumbent carrier services to operating their
own networks, reviewing courts became less deferential to the
FCC’s precompetitive initiatives. Several appellate courts
eventually rejected the FCC’s national pricing mandates based
on the conclusions that Congress only required incumbent
carriers to offer such rates in localities where the absence of
such a financial catalyst would impair the onset and
sustainability of competition.134
Reviewing courts grew weary with the ongoing role of the
FCC, not only in the matter of whether and how a carrier must
interconnect with a competitor but also the terms, conditions,
and rates of such interconnection. The courts were persuaded
that the FCC’s pricing methodology might bolster artificial
competition, sustainable only because the FCC was all but
guaranteeing a margin between the low rates incumbent
carriers had to charge and the higher retail rates CLECs could
charge customers.135 The courts also became persuaded that the
FCC’s pricing methodology removed incentives for CLECs to
134

Appellate courts required the FCC to limit precompetitive initiatives to
that perceived as minimally necessary to achieve success:
[T]he purpose of the [1996 Telecommunications] Act is not to provide the widest
possible unbundling, or to guarantee competitors access to ILEC network
elements at the lowest price that government may lawfully mandate. Rather, its
purpose is to stimulate competition-preferably genuine, facilities-based
competition. Where competitors have access to necessary inputs at rates that
allow competition not only to survive but to flourish, it is hard to see any need for
the Commission to impose the costs of mandatory unbundling.
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 576 (ordering elimination of all unbundling
requirements for access to long distance and CMRS carriers).
135
Reviewing courts determined that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
sought to promote competition by allowing market entrants the temporary option of
profitably reselling incumbent carrier services.
We also made clear that the Commission’s broad and analytically insubstantial
concept of impairment failed to pursue the “balance” between the advantages of
unbundling (in terms of fostering competition by different firms, even if they use
the very same facilities) and its costs (in terms both of “spreading the disincentive
to invest in innovation and creating complex issues of managing shared
facilities”) . . . .
Id. at 563 (identifying flaws in the FCC’s unbundling requirements and why the court
previously required more nuanced and granular precompetition requirements); see also
Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999);
Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak, & David J. Teece, Innovation, Investment, and
Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo,
Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885
(2003); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 315 (2005).
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migrate from the resale of incumbent carrier facilities to making
their own investments in new infrastructure.136 In response, the
FCC exempted new technologies from any unbundling
requirement and established dates for the elimination of
interconnection and preferential access pricing for CLECs.137
2. Elimination of Structural Safeguards
The FCC also eliminated structural separation rules.
These rules required incumbent carriers with market power to
create one or more separate subsidiaries to pursue markets
that add value to and enhance basic leased lines.138 These
requirements, articulated in the FCC’s First and Second
Computer Inquires,139 sought to establish a bright line between
basic telecommunications services and the array of
enhancements that evolved into what are now called
information services. The Commission sought to create a level,
competitive playing field between ventures unaffiliated with a
carrier providing basic network access and an informationservice affiliate of the basic network-providing carrier.140
136

Reviewing courts determined that the FCC correctly refused to mandate
sharing of competitively used facilities:
We therefore uphold the Commission’s rules concerning hybrid loops, FTTH,
and line sharing on the grounds that the decision not to unbundle these
elements was reasonable, even in the face of some CLEC impairment, in light
of evidence that unbundling would skew investment incentives in undesirable
ways and that intermodal competition from cable ensures the persistence of
substantial competition in broadband.
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 585.
137
In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2535-36
(Feb. 4, 2005) (order on remand). Cf. In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for
Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan
Statistical Area, 25 FCC Rcd. 8622 (June 22, 2010) (memorandum opinion and order)
(finding insufficient competition to justify further regulatory streamlining).
138
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,855; see also
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules & Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C. 2d 958 (1986) (report and order), vacated sub nom.
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, Computer III Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards, 6 FCC Rcd. 174 (1990) (notice of proposed
rulemaking and order), rule modification, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), vacated in part and
remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, Computer III
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Order,
10 FCC Rcd. 5692 (1995).
139
In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 (May 2, 1980) (final
decision), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
140
For background on the FCC’s Computer Inquiries, see Robert Cannon, The
Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED.
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Structural separation prevented facilities-based incumbent
carriers from offering preferential interconnection terms and
conditions to corporate affiliates.141
Carriers subject to the separate-subsidiary requirement
and other safeguards that mandated functional separation
between basic and enhanced services bristled at these
requirements. They believed that the requirements were both
unnecessary and costly.142 Over time, these carriers succeeded
in persuading the FCC to abandon these safeguards despite
never proving how such requirements resulted in lost efficiency
and synergy.143 Bear in mind that the complaining carriers

COMM. L.J. 167 (2003); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in
Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered
Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003).
141
See Robert M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the
Communications/Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 70-71 (1981);
Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED.
COMM. L.J. 383, 389 (1987).
142
Incumbent carriers framed the separate subsidiary requirement as
unnecessary and inefficient.
Parties supporting the removal of the structural separation requirements for the
provision of enhanced services by AT & T and BOCs argue that, in the current
telecommunications environment, the costs of those requirements outweigh their
benefits. On the cost side of the equation, they contend that structural separation
has imposed substantially greater burdens on the affected carriers, and
ultimately on the public, than anticipated when we established those
requirements in Computer II. In particular, a large number of parties assert that
structural separation has deprived the public of innovative services that could be
provided efficiently through AT & T’s and the BOCs’ extensive communications
networks and thus made available to a large number of potential customers.
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 978-88 (1986);
on reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987); 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987); Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Further Reconsideration, In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988);
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, In re Amendment of Sections
64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 3 F.C.C.R.
1150 (1988), rev’d and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990), on remand, In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Company Safeguards, CC Docket 90–623, 6
F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), partially aff’d and partially rev’d sub nom. California v. FCC, 4
F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993), 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).
143
The FCC abandoned structural separation requirements based on carrier
assertions of lost operational synergy and efficiency:
The following factors guide us toward replacing the Computer Inquiry obligations
for wireline broadband Internet access service providers with a less regulatory
framework: the increasing integration of innovative broadband technology into the
existing wireline platform; the growth and development of entirely new broadband
platforms; the flexibility to respond more rapidly and effectively to new consumer
demands; and our expectation of the availability of alternative competitive
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willingly created separate subsidiaries to provide “yellow page”
directory advertising and wireless services,144 perhaps because
such separateness accrued tax benefits and some degree of
insulation from having to compensate the parent carrier for
access to existing billing and database-management systems.
Even as the FCC eliminated local loop unbundling
(LLU) and structural safeguards, national regulatory
authorities (NRAs) in other nations have embraced them.145
Carriers facing such obligations have not experienced financial
distress and the competitive environment has shown measureable

broadband transmission to the currently required wireline broadband common
carrier offerings. We believe our actions today will enhance each of these factors.
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,895.
Deployment to consumers of these technologies then, at best, is delayed and, in
many cases, may be avoided altogether. Broadband Internet access services are
also not developing in ways that neatly fall within existing regulatory
classifications or the current Computer Inquiry requirements (i.e., they cannot be
easily separated into discrete information service and telecommunications service
components). As a result, unlike cable modem providers or other broadband
Internet access service competitors, wireline carriers must make either of two
less-than-optimal choices when they seek to deploy advanced network equipment:
either they must decide not to use all the equipment’s capabilities, thereby
reducing their operational efficiency; or they must defer deployment while the
manufacturer re-engineers it to facilitate compliance with the Computer Inquiry
rules, thereby creating unnecessary costs and service delays.
Id. at 14,887-88.
144
For example AT&T divides itself into four subsidiaries, two of which
provide wireless and directory publishing service:
AT&T has four main operating segments: wireless, wireline, advertising
solutions, and other. The wireless segment consists of AT&T’s subsidiary, AT&T
Mobility, which provides wireless services to both business and consumer
customers. This segment represents approximately 43 percent of 2009 total
segment operating revenues. . . . The advertising solutions segment includes
AT&T’s directory operations, which publish Yellow and White Pages directories
and sell directory advertising and Internet-based advertising and search.
In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless for
Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations and Modify a
Spectrum Leasing Arrangement, WT Docket No. 09-104, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 8704, 8706 (2010).
145
“[E]xperience both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere has indicated
that, where access to the incumbents’ networks has been allowed, it has provided a
sound platform for the successful deployment of new services. Many of these new
services-VoIP is an example-provide a significant source of competition.” Michael H
Ryan, Promoting Network-Based Competition in UK Fixed-Line Markets: A Failed
Policy, 5 CONVERGENCE 63, 72 (2009); Bob Bell, Broadband Deregulation—Similar
Legislation, Different Results: A Comparative Look at the United States and the
European Union, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 94-98 (2007); ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL LOOP
UNBUNDLING 5 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/24/6869228.pdf.
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improvement.146 For example, Britain’s dominant carrier, British
Telecom, split itself into two firms in 2006, one providing firstand last-kilometer access to telecommunications infrastructure147
and the other offering competitive services. The United Kingdom
marketplace has become robustly competitive without harming
incumbent British Telecom’s financial viability and stock
attractiveness.148 The nations of the European Union continue to
embrace structural separation and LLU. Other nations with LLU
requirements include Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland,
South Africa, Australia, and Hong Kong.149
146

Many national regulatory authorities endorse local loop unbundling as a
vehicle for stimulating competition and expediting development of next generation
broadband networks:
Korea has acquired world-class broadband internet services through a successful
combination of industrial and competition policy. From the start, the Ministry of
Information and Communication aggressively pursued industrial policy in the
sector, but without stifling competition. It fostered competition in the market by
lowering entry barriers and intervening to prevent KT from gaining too much of a
competitive edge. It also adopted a local loop unbundling strategy to address
concerns about unfair competition. The success of the government’s broadband
internet strategy is apparent in the penetration ratio . . . . What can we learn
from this Korean example? At an early stage of development, the government
recognized the need for fundamental infrastructure. As an industrial policy
measure, it required market entrants to install their own facilities while helping
to create the market conditions that would make this affordable. Later, after
sufficient facilities had been set up throughout Korea, the government changed
tack and began to enforce an “essential facilities” doctrine that rested on local loop
unbundling. This enabled new entrants to secure a foothold in an established
market on a competitive basis. This demonstrates that under certain
circumstances industrial policy can function alongside competition policy to
achieve an ultimate economic policy goal, without producing undesirable side
effects from a competition policy perspective.
Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea’s Competition Law and Policies in
Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 719-20 (2006); see also CHRISTINE ZHEN-WEI
QIANG, BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN STIMULUS PACKAGES: RELEVANCE
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/28282
2-1208273252769/Broadband_Investment_in_Stimulus_Packages.pdf; What Is Local Loop
Unbundling?, OFCOM, http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/broadband/dsl_
facts/LLUbackground.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); EWAN SUTHERLAND, LINK CENTRE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, UNBUNDLING LOCAL LOOPS: GLOBAL EXPERIENCES
(2007), available at http://link.wits.ac.za/papers/LINK.pdf; Paul W.J. de Bijl & Martin Peitz,
Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges, COMM. &
STRATEGIES, 1st Qtr. 2005, at 33, 35-50, available at http://www.idate.fr/fic/revue_telech/
414/CS57_BIJL_PEITZ.pdf.
147
See OPENREACH, KEEPING THE UK CONNECTED 4-6 (2008), available at
http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/home/aboutus/downloads/web_corp_brochure.pdf.
148
Liz Tay, BT: Functional Separation Was a Success, IT NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009, 12:17
AM), http://www.itnews.com.au/News/159659,bt-functional-separation-was-a-success.aspx;
see also OFCOM, COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 15-16 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/753567/CMR_2010_FINAL.pdf.
149
See Network Unbundling, INFODEV, ICT REGULATION TOOLKIT 4.5.5 (Dec. 28,
2011), http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3426.html; Robert W. Crandall,
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3. Courts Infer the Absence of a Common Carrier Duty
to Deal
Appellate courts have determined that there is no
antitrust remedy if the FCC has relaxed its oversight of carrier
interconnection terms and conditions based on its expert
assessment of marketplace competition. Put another way, if the
FCC determines that the scope of competition is sufficient to
trigger abandonment of regulatory safeguards, reviewing
courts have no basis to second guess the Commission. In
application, this means that reviewing courts have great
reluctance to impose more burdensome safeguards than what
the FCC, in its expert judgment, has deemed unnecessary.
Verizon v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko150 resolved
uncertainty about whether antitrust claims can exist based on
the obligations imposed on ILECs by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and, if so, whether individual customers have
standing to assert such claims. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, limited to the question of whether the court of
appeals erred in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the
respondent’s antitrust claims.151
The Court held that the “savings clause” contained in
the ‘96 Act152 does not foreclose application of antitrust laws to
ILEC behavior. However, the Court noted that such inclusion
in the text of the Communications Act does not provide
significantly greater scrutiny of or safeguards against
anticompetitive practices. The relaxation of existing regulatory
oversight performed by the FCC and state regulatory agencies
does not create a mandate for new antitrust safeguards for
courts to enforce:
But just as the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing
antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond
existing antitrust standards; that would be equally inconsistent with

Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Robert E. Litan, Vertical Separation of Telecommunications
Networks: Evidence from Five Countries, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 493 (2010).
150
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
151
See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp.
2d 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing antitrust claims), aff’d in part, vacated in part and
remanded, 294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7746), as superseded, 305 F.3d 89
(2002), cert. granted in part sub nom. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 538 U.S. 905 (2003).
152
“Section 601(b)(1) of the 1996 Act is an antitrust-specific saving clause
providing that ‘nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws.’” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406 (citing 110 Stat. 143, 47 U.S.C. § 152).
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the saving clause’s mandate that nothing in the Act “modify, impair,
or supersede the applicability” of the antitrust laws.153

Having concluded that the ‘96 Act does not foreclose
antitrust cases, the Court easily rejected the applicability of
the Sherman Act to a claim that Verizon discriminated against
competitors when they sought access to individual, unbundled
network services provided by Verizon:
We conclude that Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under
this Court’s existing refusal-to-deal precedents. This conclusion would
be unchanged even if we considered to be established law the “essential
facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower courts, under which the Court
of Appeals concluded respondent’s allegations might state a claim.154

The Court concluded that both the FCC and state
regulatory agencies can investigate claims that an ILEC had
failed to comply with ‘96 Act requirements and, in turn, can
impose financial penalties, remediation measures, and
additional reporting requirements for noncompliance:
Finally, we do not believe that traditional antitrust principles justify
adding the present case to the few existing exceptions from the
proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors. Antitrust
analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to
economic context is an awareness of the significance of regulation.155

The Supreme Court’s deference to the FCC’s
deregulatory campaign has gone so far as to allow an
incumbent carrier to engage in predatory price squeezing, or to
offer end users lower rates than what it charges competitors.156
In 2003, several ISPs filed suit against Pacific Bell Telephone
Co. contending that the company attempted to monopolize the
market for DSL broadband Internet access by creating a price
squeeze where ISP competitors were obligated to pay a higher
wholesale price than what Pacific Bell offered on a retail
basis.157 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the ISPs could present their price squeeze
claim, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trinko.

153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 407.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 411.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 449-55 (2009).
Id. at 443-44.
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The Supreme Court assumed that Pacific Bell had no
antitrust duty to deal with any ISPs based on the FCC’s premise
that ample facilities-based competition existed.158 Curiously, the
Court did not mention that Pacific Bell could have avoided a
unilateral duty to deal with ISPs based on the FCC’s conclusion
that DSL, and presumably its component parts, constituted
information services and not common-carrier-provided
telecommunications services. But for a voluntary concession to
secure the FCC’s approval of AT&T’s acquisition of another
ILEC, the Court noted that Pacific Bell would not have a duty
even to provide ISPs with wholesale service.159 The Court granted
certiorari to resolve the narrow question of whether ISP
plaintiffs can bring a price-squeeze claim under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act when the defendant carrier has no antitrustmandated duty to deal with the plaintiffs.160 The lower courts
concluded that the Trinko precedent did not bar such a claim,
but the Supreme Court reversed this holding.161
On procedural grounds, the Court’s decision chided the
ISP plaintiffs for changing the nature of their claim from a
price squeeze to one characterizing Pacific Bell’s tactics as
predatory pricing.162 On substantive grounds, the Court noted
158

“DSL now faces robust competition from cable companies and wireless and
satellite services.” Id. at 443.
159
“As a condition for a recent merger, however, AT & T remains bound by the
mandatory interconnection requirements, and is obligated to provide wholesale ‘DSL
transport’ service to independent firms at a price no greater than the retail price of AT
& T’s DSL service.” Id.
160
“We granted certiorari, 554 U.S. 916, . . . to resolve a conflict over whether
a plaintiff can bring price-squeeze claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act when the
defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiff.” Id. at 435-46.
161
The Court supported the theoretical possibility that an antitrust claim
could survive in a deregulated environment.
Our grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether price-squeeze claims
are cognizable in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal. The Court of Appeals
addressed only AT & T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the plaintiffs’
original complaint. For the reasons stated we hold that the price-squeeze claims
set forth in that complaint are not cognizable under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 455-56.
162
The Court noted that the plaintiffs appeared to have shifted their claim
from Pacific Bell engaging in a price squeeze to one alleging predatory pricing.
This case has assumed an unusual posture. The plaintiffs now assert that they
agree with Judge Gould’s dissenting position that price-squeeze claims must meet
the Brooke Group requirements for predatory pricing. They ask us to vacate the
decision below in their favor and remand with instructions that they be given
leave to amend their complaint to allege a Brooke Group claim. In other words,
plaintiffs are no longer pleased with their initial theory of the case, and ask for a
mulligan to try again under a different theory.
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that a new emphasis on predatory pricing would have required
determination of whether the retail price was set below cost,163 a
claim the ISPs did not make. The Court determined that the
case did not become moot because of the change in economic
and antitrust arguments.164 But the decision evidences great
skepticism as to whether the ISPs had any basis for a claim. In
the Court’s reasoning, the ISPs failed to make a claim that
Pacific Bell’s retail DSL prices were predatory, and the ISPs
also failed to refute the Court’s conclusion that Pacific Bell had
no duty to deal with the ISPs (i.e., to provide wholesale
service).165 The Court could apparently ignore the voluntary
concession AT&T made that created a duty to deal because that
concession may have triggered FCC oversight, but the
concession could not change whether an antitrust duty to deal
arose. The Court read the Trinko case as foreclosing any
antitrust claim if no antitrust duty to deal exists.166
The Court remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the ISP plaintiffs had a viable predatory
pricing claim.167 The Court expressed the need for clear
Id. at 446.
163

The Court referenced Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), which supports the inference that a predatory pricing claim
can be established only with proof of below-cost pricing coupled with evidence that the
defendant can subsequently recoup any lost profits. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 446-47.
164
The Court determined that a shift in framing what anticompetitive
practice occurred did not by itself render the claim moot.
We do not think this case is moot. First, the parties continue to seek different
relief. AT & T asks us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint at issue. The plaintiffs ask
that we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions that they be given
leave to amend their complaint. The parties thus continue to be adverse not only
in the litigation as a whole, but in the specific proceedings before this Court.
Linkline, 555 U.S. at 446.
165
“The challenge here focuses on retail prices—where there is no predatory
pricing—and the terms of dealing—where there is no duty to deal.” Id. at 449. “If there
is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level,
then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a manner that
preserves its rivals’ margins.” Id. at 452.
166
“In this case, as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with
its rivals at wholesale; any such duty arises only from FCC regulations, not from the
Sherman Act.” Id. at 450.
167
The Court remanded the case for lower court determination whether a
viable antitrust claim existed.
It is for the District Court on remand to consider whether the amended complaint
states a claim upon which relief may be granted in light of the new pleading
standard we articulated in Twombly, whether plaintiffs should be given leave to
amend their complaint to bring a claim under Brooke Group, and such other
matters properly before it.
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antitrust rules and apparently viewed consumer access to low
retail prices—predatory or not—as sufficient reason for courts
to refrain from intervening. Remarkably, the Court did not
seem troubled by the threat of all ISPs’ competitors exiting the
market, an event that surely would enable the surviving
incumbent carrier to raise rates: “For if AT&T can bankrupt
the plaintiffs by refusing to deal altogether, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate why the law prevents AT&T from putting them
out of business by pricing them out of the market.”168
This case evidences a strong reluctance on the part of the
Supreme Court to support any review over the pricing strategies
of carriers. Presumably the plaintiffs could have petitioned the
FCC to review the broadband wholesale prices, but the
Commission could have claimed that it had no jurisdiction to
investigate because the DSL service at issue constituted an
information service not subject to Title II pricing and
nondiscrimination requirements.169 In light of the regulatory
objectives contained in the ‘96 Act, which the Court deemed
“much more ambitious than the antitrust laws,”170 more powerful
safeguards against anticompetitive practices already exist. The
Court opted not to second guess why the FCC refrained from
using its lawful authority to remedy an obvious price squeeze.
C.

Eliminating Cellular Radio Spectrum Caps

In 2003, the FCC eliminated a cap on the amount of
spectrum a single wireless telecommunications carrier can
acquire based on a determination of ample competition.171
Id. at 456.
168

Id. at 456-57.
The holding in Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), and the reversal of the FCC’s attempt to
sanction Comcast for meddling with subscribers’ use of cable modem broadband links,
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), confirm that the FCC has no
direct statutory mandate to regulate the terms and conditions by which a carrier offers
information services including DSL.
170
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 415 (2004).
171
Despite evidence to the contrary, the FCC concluded that a robustly
competitive wireless telecommunication market existed:
169

Measures of market concentration in the record show a substantial continuing
decline in concentration in most local CMRS [commercial mobile radio service]
markets. We find that considerable entry has occurred and that meaningful
competition is present, particularly given the presence of such earmarks of
competition as falling prices, increasing output, and improving service quality and
options. Specifically, concentration in CMRS markets, as measured by subscriber
share, is falling.
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Coupled with the Commission’s approval of each and every
merger application it had received,172 the Commission all but
guaranteed a concentrated marketplace for wireless services.173
In light of increasing reliance on wireless services to serve all
consumers’ information, communications, and entertainment
requirements, the FCC should have concluded that such
consolidation would adversely affect the level of competition
and the public interest. Advocates for merger approval have
heralded efficiency gains from scale, the possibility of increased
employment, spectrum scarcity, and extraordinary growth in
demand for services.174 To these advocates, a spectrum cap
would prevent a single carrier from satisfying demand and a
proliferation of carriers presumably would not be able
collectively to achieve such goals.
When it removed the spectrum cap, the FCC made
summary assertions without using any serious or rigorous
analysis about the consequences. The Commission never
considered that removing a spectrum cap would eliminate an

In re 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, 16 FCC Rcd. 22,668, 22,682 (Dec. 18, 2001) (report and order).
The FCC rejected as a significant barrier to market entry the need to acquire spectrum,
in light of the Commission’s view that resale opportunities would suffice.
Nonetheless, there are factors that moderate concern regarding the spectrum
access barrier to entry. In particular, the need for direct access to spectrum is not
absolute because carriers can compete in the provision of CMRS without direct
access to spectrum through resale, or a mobile virtual network operator
(“MVNO”) arrangement.
Id. at 22,690.
172
See, e.g., In re Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and
Atlantis Holdings LLC, 23 FCC Rcd. 17,444, 17,546-47 (Nov. 10, 2008); In re Applications
of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. and Cingular Wireless Corporation for Consent to
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, 19 FCC Rcd. 21,522, 21,626 (Oct. 26,
2004); see also Archive of Major Transactions, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/
major-transactions-archive (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
173
The FCC’s most recent statistics show that in 2009 the top four wireless
carriers in the United States served 90.42 percent of all subscribers and generated
93.25 percent of all revenues. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, 26
FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697, tbl.4, Service Provider Share of Subscribers and Revenues (YearEnd 2009) (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report).
174
See, e.g., Acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc. by AT&T Inc. Description of
Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, Comment from
AT&T, Inc. to the FCC (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=7021240421; In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom
AG, Comments of Communications Workers of America to the FCC (May 31, 2011),
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021681259; In re Applications
of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc., Deutsche Telekom
AG, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. to Petitions to Deny and Reply to Comments to the FCC (June
10, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021686831.
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ex ante safeguard that helps prevent anticompetitive
consequences before harm has occurred. Arguably, ex ante
safeguards are more essential in light of the Commission’s
elimination of common-carrier duties to deal and case law that
all but eliminates antitrust remedies.175 As a basis for
comparison, other nations, including the United Kingdom,
support spectrum caps in the mobile wireless marketplace. The
UK’s telecommunications regulator has acknowledged that
high barriers to entry and the potential for excessive
concentration176 justify spectrum caps:
We also propose to put in place safeguard caps to guard against longer
term[] risks to competition from very asymmetric holdings of
spectrum. While we do not think that spectrum needs to be held
equally for there to be effective competition or equality of opportunity
to compete, we do think that there could be a risk if some national
wholesalers held a very large share of mobile spectrum. While it is
difficult to speculate about future possible developments, we consider
it is possible that in the longer term there could be technological (e.g.
beyond LTE) or market developments that meant that very
asymmetric holdings of spectrum represented a risk to competition,
especially for sub-1 GHz spectrum.177

175

In light of the substantial deregulation that has occurred, the remaining
regulatory oversight provides essential safeguards.
[A] sector regulator can introduce ex ante means, of which spectrum caps are one
example, to help ensure that markets remain truly competitive. To the extent that
policy makers believe they should have a portfolio of ex post and ex ante measures
at their disposal to facilitate and ensure effective competition in markets for the
sake of users, consumers, and overall welfare, then both a sector regulator in
telecommunications and a Competition Authority have valuable roles to play.
Martyn F. Roetter, Mobile Broadband, Competition and Spectrum Caps, ARTHUR D. LITTLE 21
(Jan. 2009), http://hspa-titian.profissionhosting.com/upload/news/files/05032009134807.pdf.
176
The United Kingdom telecommunications regulatory authority considered
it essential to impose spectrum caps on wireless carriers:
We consider that if we put in place no measures in the combined award to
promote competition, there is a material risk of an outcome that would lead to
lower competitive intensity in the provision of higher quality data services
compared to competition in the wholesale market today, and compared to what
might be possible. This is because we consider there is a material risk of only two
or three national wholesalers emerging from the auction capable of providing
higher quality data services in a profitable way. This is especially the case given
that there are high barriers to entry to the national wholesale market, including
the difficulty of obtaining access to suitable spectrum.
Ofcom, Consultation on Assessment of Future Mobile Competition and Proposals for
the Award of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz Spectrum and Related Issues 45 ¶ 5.58 (Mar. 22,
2011), available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/combinedaward/summary/combined-award.pdf [hereinafter Ofcom Future Mobile Consultation].
177
Id. at 49, ¶ 5.83.
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Only recently, with 91.2 percent of the wireless market
controlled by four national carriers, has the Commission begun
to express doubts about whether concentration in the wireless
marketplace generates sufficient competition.178 Previously the
Commission expressed no concern that incumbent carriers
would acquire the lion’s share of any newly available spectrum.
For example, in the auctions for choice 700 MHz spectrum,
which were made available when television broadcasters
converted to digital transmissions, the two largest incumbent
carriers, AT&T and Verizon, spent $16 billion of the $19.6
billion collected by the U.S. government.179
178

With an eye toward providing better fact-based assessments of industry
competitiveness, the FCC’s recent reports on the wireless marketplace use a more
sophisticated and granular assessment:
[R]ather than reaching an overarching, industry-wide determination with respect
to whether there is “effective competition,” the Report complies with the statutory
requirement by providing a detailed analysis of the state of competition that seeks
to identify areas where market conditions appear to be producing substantial
consumer benefits and provides data that can form the basis for inquiries into
whether policy levers could produce superior outcomes.
In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, 25 FCC Rcd. 11,407, 11,411, 11,407 (May 20, 2010) (fourteenth report)
[hereinafter 14th Wireless Competition Report]. The Commission largely disputes its
previous determinations of robust competition. For example, in 2006 the FCC reported
that despite having approved a major merger, “[e]ven with one less nationwide mobile
telephone carrier to choose from, U.S. consumers continue to benefit from robust
competition in the CMRS marketplace.” In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive
Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947,
11,029 (Sep. 29, 2006) (eleventh report). More recent Commission reports are less
confident about the sufficiency of competition: “Over the past five years, concentration
has increased in the provision of mobile wireless services. The two largest providers,
AT&T and Verizon Wireless, have 60 percent of both subscribers and revenue, and
continue to gain share (accounting for 12.3 million net additions in 2008 and 14.1 million
during 2009).” Id. at 11,412. The Commission uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to
measure wireless industry concentration and reports that the current figure of 2848
exceeds the 1800 figure used by the Department of Justice to identify “highly
concentrated” industries. See id. at 11,451-55; see also Annual Report and Analysis of
Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial
Mobile Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697, Table 4, Service Provider Share of
Subscribers and Revenues (Year-End 2009) (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report).
179
AT&T and Verizon acquired the most spectrum and bid the most money in
the FCC’s auction of 700 MHz wireless spectrum:
According to an analysis by The Associated Press, the two telecom companies bid
more than $16 billion, constituting the vast majority of the overall $19.6 billion
that was bid in the FCC auction. With Verizon Wireless and AT&T dominating
the auction so completely, hopes that the auction would allow for the creation of a
new nationwide wireless service provider were dashed.
W. David Gardner, Verizon, AT&T Big Winners in 700 MHz Auction, INFO. WEEK (Mar.
20, 2008), http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/showArticle.jhtml?articleID
=206905000; see also Saul Hansell, Verizon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum,
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In light of the Commission’s favorable treatment of
merger requests, AT&T Wireless applied to acquire T-Mobile.180
AT&T claimed the merger would help it abate a severe
spectrum shortage and promote the company’s ability to
provide wireless broadband services to rural locales on an
accelerated basis.181 The company had sought to shift attention
from the market-concentrating impact of the merger because
acquiring T-Mobile’s 14 percent market share would boost
AT&T’s share to over 40 percent, which, combined with
Verizon’s share, would result in two companies controlling
almost 80 percent of the market.182 AT&T sought to frame the
merger as a means for the company to improve customer
service and to compensate for delays in FCC regulatory reform,
especially the Commission’s inability to make more spectrum
available for wireless services.183
AT&T’s now failed merger with T-Mobile184 constitutes an
exception to a long list of approved mergers made possible by the
FCC’s removal of a spectrum cap. Had the Commission retained
the cap, the wireless marketplace may today have had more
competition, innovation, and consumer choice. The four major
carriers do not deviate significantly from a business model that
offers subscribers a subsidized handset in exchange for a twoyear service commitment and a hefty financial penalty for early
termination of service.185 Wireless carriers charge rates that
contribute to the recoupment of the handset subsidy and
subscribers have few options for cheaper service if they activate
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/technology/21auction.html;
Factsheet for Auction 73, FCC (Mar. 20, 2008), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=73.
180
See Acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc. by AT&T Inc. Description of
Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, supra note 174.
181
“As we have shown, AT&T is facing severe capacity constraints in markets
throughout the United States, and this merger is the surest and most efficient solution
to those constraints.” Id. at 5.
182
See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697 tbl.4 (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth
report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-103A1.doc
[hereinafter 15th CMRS Competition Record].
183
See Response of AT&T Inc. to Information and Discovery Request Dated May
27, 2011 to the FCC (June 10, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=7021687006.
184
See Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom Ag for Consent to Assign
or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, DA 11-1955 (order) (Nov. 29, 2011).
185
For example, compare AT&T Wireless service plans, AT&T: PLANS,
http://www.wireless.att.com/businesscenter/plans/index.jsp?wtLinkName=Plans&wtLi
nkLoc=MNB&WT.svl=2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012), with the nearly identical terms and
conditions available from Verizon Wireless, VERIZON WIRELESS: CELL PHONE PLANS,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/plans.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
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a used and unsubsidized handset. Had the spectrum cap
remained in force, perhaps one or more carriers would have
pursued a different business plan, maybe concentrating on data
services and offering an open interface to content and software
instead of the tightly controlled access erected by the four major
carriers and handset manufacturers such as Apple.
U.S. wireless carriers claim they must aggressively
compete by offering consumers world-class service in terms of
monthly minutes of use, price, and innovation.186 On the positive
side, the carriers correctly report that their rate plans offer large
baskets of voice minutes and—at least until recently—unlimited
data access plans.187 Additionally, carriers typically offer services
that do not debit the monthly usage allotment when a subscriber
calls another subscriber of the same carrier.188 On the other
hand, U.S. wireless carriers offer services with nearly identical
price points. Service terms do not stimulate competition and
innovation even as these carriers generate some of the world’s
highest margins and average revenue per user (ARPU).189
Provided subscribers do not deviate from relatively narrow,
carrier-defined usage parameters, both carriers and customers
can benefit. However, one can only speculate how much more
robust, innovative, and dynamic the industry could have become
had the FCC retained the spectrum cap.
Instead, the FCC overstates the positive benefits
accruing from an increasingly concentrated industry. By using
carrier-provided estimates of ARPU, average minutes of use,
186

U.S. wireless carriers claim they operate in a robustly competitive and
innovative marketplace:
American consumers are the world’s wireless winners because today’s wireless
ecosystem has evolved into a virtuous cycle of innovation and fierce competition.
The U.S. regulatory approach has enabled American consumers to benefit from
better value and more cutting-edge wireless products and services than
consumers in other countries. Due to flexible, market-driven policies, the U.S.
wireless industry is the most innovative and competitive. We are the example
that other countries try to emulate.
Innovation and Competition, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/
policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/64 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
187
See, e.g., Wireless Industry Innovation: We’re #1, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N
BLOG (June 14, 2011), http://blog.ctia.org/2011/06/14/wireless-industry-innovation-were-1/
(compiling a list of industry leading accomplishments by U.S. wireless carriers).
188
“One of the main benefits of choosing an AT&T Mobile Phone Plan is
unlimited calls to other AT&T wireless mobile users.” AT&T Wireless Phone Service,
AT&T, http://www.att-services.net/att-wireless.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
189
“The average monthly subscriber bill (ARPU) in the United States, at
$51.54, is much higher than the Western European average of $33.45.” 14th Wireless
Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,619.
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and cost-per-minute of service, the FCC has reported a mostly
happy story about the U.S. wireless marketplace. Only recently
has the Commission started to acknowledge the highly
concentrated nature of the wireless marketplace.190 The
Commission has generally dismissed any problems drawn from
credible and frequently used measures of severe industry
concentration. Factoring in Verizon’s $28 billion acquisition of
Alltel, a company with a 5.2 percent market share, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) generated a concentration
score of 2848, well above the 1800/2500 figure that triggers a
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission “highly
concentrated” market finding.191 Apparently for wireless
markets, other factors support a decision not to worry about
the HHI score, including the availability of many subsidized
handsets, non-price rivalry, and the $3.4 billion the four major
wireless carriers spent on advertising in 2009.192 Additionally,
the FCC has reported to Congress that CMRS carriers have at
least 586 MHz of spectrum available.193 However, a close
examination of the frequency bands identified by the
Commission generates questions whether carriers can offer a
190

The FCC belatedly has begun to acknowledge how concentrated the U.S.
wireless marketplace has become:
In the mobile wireless services industry, the weighted average of HHIs (weighted
by population across the 172 Economic Areas in the United States) was 2811 at
the end of 2009, compared to 2842 at the end of 2008. Both the lowest HHI values
and the highest HHI values by Economic Area decreased in 2009 relative to 2008.
From 2003 (the first year the Commission calculated HHIs) to 2009, the average
HHI has increased from 2151 to 2811, an increase of 660 points. As of mid-2010,
the weighted average of the HHIs has increased to 2848, slightly higher than the
year-end 2008 level.
15th CMRS Competition Record, supra note 182, at 9679.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the
squared market shares of all firms in any given market, is a commonly used
measure of industry concentration. Antitrust authorities in the United States
generally classify markets into three types: Unconcentrated (HHI < 1500),
Moderately Concentrated (1500 < HHI < 2500), and Highly Concentrated
(HHI > 2500).
Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf).
191
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/
15.html. In April 2010, the Justice Department and the FTC raised the concentrated industry
floor to a 2500 HHI level. 14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,451.
192
In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9748 (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report);
see also 14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,491-92.
193
14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,566.
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functionally equivalent service option based on propagational
characteristics of the available spectrum and company business
plans. For example, Clearwire, a company identified as
providing a competitive alternative to CMRS, concentrates on
data services to users and only offers VoIP service to users with
wireless-modem-equipped, portable computers. The company
does not provide a functional and competitive alternative to
mobile services accessible via small handsets like those used by
CMRS subscribers.194
III.

CONCLUSION

National regulatory authorities such as the FCC
typically have a statutory duty to serve the public interest and
to recalibrate the nature and scope of their oversight when
circumstances change. Technological innovations surely
promote the possibility of more competition, but the
countervailing trends of convergence create incentives for
incumbents to diversify and serve new markets while
expanding in size and scale. The cross-currents of potentially
greater competition, but also consolidation of control by
incumbents, should motivate NRAs to streamline regulations
with caution and on an incremental basis. The FCC did not
embrace this course of action and opted instead to make
expansive deregulatory pronouncements based largely on
nonempirical, overly optimistic assessments about the future
sustainability of existing and future competition.
In the four case studies examined in this article, the
FCC has identified problems necessitating its intervention or
reassessment, but the Commission’s prior acts now prevent it
from crafting quick and lawful solutions.195 When it opted to
194

Clearwire’s web site specifies that the carrier provides service to laptop
computers, not handsets: “The CLEAR 4G modem plugs into your laptop for the
ultimate high-speed connection. Stream movies and videos across your city, video chat
at the park, download files on-the-go and much, much more.” CLEAR INTERNET,
http://internet.clear.com/mobile-broadband.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
195
The Commission rarely has the inclination or authority to undo a
streamlined regulation in light of changed circumstances. A rare exception occurred
when the Commission approved the merger of Sirius and XM satellite digital audio
radio services (SDARS).
At that time, the Commission agreed that market forces produced by the robust
competition between two SDARS competitors would ensure that listeners would
receive noncommercial educational and public interest programming on the
SDARS service. In the absence of such competitive forces post-merger, we find the
potential harm to programming diversity greater than was the case in 1997.
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apply unconditionally the information-services classification to
all types of broadband Internet access, the FCC abdicated its
authority even to resolve legitimate complaints of
discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct. When it freed
Title II–regulated common carriers of many core
responsibilities—such as the duty to cooperate with
competitors on fair terms, conditions, and prices—the
Commission made it possible for reviewing courts to conclude
that these carriers no longer had a duty to deal with each other
subject to FCC oversight. Even a blatantly anticompetitive
practice, such as offering retail rates below the wholesale rate
offered to a competitor, does not trigger a judicial remedy
because reviewing courts can defer to the FCC’s expert
conclusion that marketplace competition would discipline
carriers and offer readily available and cheaper alternatives to
carriers’ engaging in price squeezes. When the FCC eliminated
spectrum caps, it allowed incumbent carriers to achieve
necessary scale, but also to benefit from extraordinarily high
barriers to market entry all but guaranteeing a concentrated
market, which is compounded by lax merger review.
The FCC has executed a strategy that favors
incumbents best equipped to exploit streamlined or eliminated
regulation for private gain. The competition identified or
predicted by the Commission has failed to reach effective and
sustainable levels. Rather than imposing so-called heavy-handed
regulations, the FCC has removed regulatory safeguards that
would require scrutiny of incumbents’ efforts to achieve market
dominance, including tactics that might constitute unfair trade
practices and violations of competition policies.
Only recently has the FCC changed its approach and
recognized anticompetitive conduct and market concentration.
The FCC has determined that it should resolve complaints
regarding the allegedly anticompetitive practices of certain ISPs.
The Commission no longer reports to Congress that the mobile
wireless marketplace unconditionally operates with effective
competition,196 or that Americans enjoy ubiquitous access to
In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, 23 FCC Rcd.
12,348, 12,413 (Aug. 5, 2008) (memorandum opinion and order and report and order).
196
The FCC no longer unconditionally concludes that the U.S. wireless
marketplace evidences effective competition:
[W]e find that the mobile wireless ecosystem is sufficiently complex and multifaceted that it would not be meaningful to try to make a single, all-inclusive
finding regarding effective competition that adequately encompasses the level of
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competitive broadband services.197 Additionally, the Commission
has launched a reassessment of whether middle-mile
telecommunications links between end users and carriers are
priced at competitive levels.198 The Commission apparently now
sees the need to impose duties to deal fairly and on reasonable
terms and conditions even for carriers who claim regulatory
streamlining exempts them from government oversight.
It remains to be seen whether and how the FCC can
maneuver around all the consumer-protection tools it has
abandoned. Already courts have rejected the Commission’s
creative and novel invocations of ancillary jurisdiction in lieu of
direct statutory authority. Had the Commission acted
cautiously it would have lost the ability to make a big
deregulatory pronouncement, but years later it would be in a
position to act when needed.
Sadly, remedies for the FCC and the nation cannot arrive
anytime soon, because Congress appears unable to reach
consensus on necessary amendments to the Communications Act
of 1934. Whether and how the FCC should regulate has become
a contentious issue based largely on economic and political
philosophy and not empirical evidence.199 The FCC needs a clear
statutory basis to provide public-interest safeguards for
consumers of information services and to make sensible and
limited retreats from several deregulatory initiatives. Such
reassessments would not signal a resumption of intrusive and
potentially harmful regulation. Instead the FCC would have
clear legislative authority to assess the current state of
telecommunications and information-service markets and to
make midcourse corrections in the scope of deregulation.
Absent new statutory authority the FCC will continue
to struggle with no certainty whether an assertion of ancillary
competition in the various interrelated segments, types of services, and vast
geographic areas of the mobile wireless industry.
15th CMRS Competition Report, supra note 182, at 9691.
197
The FCC states that “that broadband is not being deployed in a reasonable
and timely fashion to all Americans.” Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion,
and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement
Act, GN Docket No. 10-159, FCC 11-78, ¶ 1 (May 20, 2011) (seventh broadband
progress report and order on reconsideration).
198
In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4676 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice
of proposed rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (seeking comment
on reasons for high middle mile costs and whether to use universal funding support to
expand capacity and reduce price).
199
See generally Frieden, supra note 26, at 277-312.
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jurisdiction will pass muster with a reviewing court. The
Commission has achieved success in applying what it considers
necessary consumer safeguards for VoIP, but similar efforts to
curb ISP anticompetitive practices have failed. The
Commission lacks clear guidance on the reach of its jurisdiction
at the very time it needs to provide guidance to stakeholders,
particularly ones that use the Internet to serve as a medium
for a combination of voice, data, and video services.

